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INTRODUCTION
The view that social relations are constructed and power is ex-
ercised through complex processes of negotiation is now widely
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shared.' While the dynamics of power and negotiation are always
uncertain and difficult to chart, most contemporary theorists no
longer assert either that "society is ... an association of self-deter-
mining individuals" 2 or that social action is epiphenomenal and de-
termined by underlying structural realities. 3  They realize that
power is always "involved institutionally in processes of interac-
tion. ' 4 In the past the effort to understand power oscillated be-
tween the antinomies of structure and action.5 Today, every variety
of theory recognizes that "notions of action and structure presuppose
one another."6
Social structure is no more than patterns of behavior generated
and re-generated through negotiations in people's daily lives.7
However it may appear to people subject to it, social structure is
produced and maintained through human action. Neither social
structure nor the power associated with it can be external to human
interaction or abstracted from the practices of everyday life. To the
contrary, both are encoded in seemingly uneventful and routinized
I See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & THOMASJ. LUKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 30-32, 119 (1966); STANFORD M.
LYMAN & MARVIN B. ScoTr, THE DRAMA OF SOCIAL REALITY 106-11 (1975); Thomas J.
Scheff, Negotiating Reality: Notes on Power in the Assessment of Responsibility, 16 Soc. PROBS. 4
(1968).
2 Robert Paul Wolff, Beyond Tolerance, in A CRI0.UE OF PURE TOLERANCE 3, 5
(1965).
3 See CLAUDE LEvI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1968); INO Rossi, THE
UNCONSCIOUS IN CULTURE 16-21 (1974).
4 ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL THEORY 88 (1979).
Giddens adds, "[e]ven a casual survey of the massive literature concerned
with the concept of power and its implementation in social science indi-
cates that the study of power reflects the same dualism of action and
structure that I have diagnosed in approaches to social theory generally."
Id.; see also STEPHEN LUKES, POWER, A RADICAL VIEW 21-23 (1974) (arguing that other
conceptions of power are inadequate because of their "association of power with actual,
observable conflict.").
5 Giddens describes these antithetical views: "Social systems are produced as
transactions between agents, and can be analysed as such on the level of strategic con-
duct.... Institutional analysis, on the other hand, brackets action, concentrating upon
the modalities as the media of the reproduction of social systems." GIDDENS, supra note
4, at 95.
6 Id. at 53. Giddens defines action "as involving a 'stream of actual or contem-
plated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the
world .... Id. at 55. In contrast, " 'structure' refers to 'structural property,' or more
exactly, to 'structuring property,' structuring properties providing the 'binding' of time
and space in social systems. Structures exist paradigmatically, as an absent set of differ-
ences, temporally 'present' only in their instantiation, in the constituting moments of
social systems." Id. at 64.
7 For an interesting case study of this process, see LAWRENCE ROSEN, BARGAINING
FOR REALITY: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS IN A MUSLIM COMMUNITY 165-69
(1984).
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experiences.8 It is because of this presence in every social situation
that structure and power are vulnerable to major changes of
practice.
Although structure and power are created through ordinary ac-
tion in ordinary circumstances, past practice as it is embedded in
history and habit limits the choices that can be made. While people
work out the terms of their interactions daily, they do not begin with
a clean slate each day or in each situation; within any setting there is
a limited number of available moves. Consider the situation of
teacher and student or employer and employee at the beginning of
any ordinary day. Hierarchical relationships, routine divisions of la-
bor, and parochial practices will generally dictate who exercises
what kinds of authority over what kinds of matters, who will do what
and how each of the participants will feel about the day's tasks. The
student will not question the lesson plan or the teacher's preroga-
tive to evaluate student performance; the employee will not openly
resist the day's assignment or the employer's prerogative to say
when a job is ready for delivery to a customer.
However, over long stretches of time these exercises of hierar-
chical control may be resented and resisted in minor and subtle
ways. Or in an abrupt fashion they may be overtly and definitively
challenged. When we next examine these relationships, if we find
that lesson plans are negotiated and teacher performance is evalu-
ated by students and that employees have control over work assign-
ments as long as certain end goals are met, we see that structure has
changed and power is reallocated although no revolution has been
proclaimed and no general notice may have been taken.9
Whatever the form of these interactions, the social phenomena
that occur are negotiated. If this negotiation is not explicit, it is car-
ried on through the exercise of power and attempts at resistance
and subversion.' 0 Surprisingly, a review of the empirical literature
on the lawyer-client relationship hardly suggests that lawyers and
clients negotiate relationships, or that they enact the structure and
meaning of professionalism and professional power through negoti-
ation. The literature portrays professional practice as dominated by
the lawyer or the client, depending on who has superior status or
resources, or as split into rigidly defined spheres of influence, with
8 "Analysis shows that a relation (always social) determines its terms, and not the
reverse, and that each individual is a locus in which an incoherent (and often contradic-
tory) plurality of such relational determinations interact." MICHEL DE CERTEAu, THE
PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE xi (1984).
9 ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
10 See JEAN COMAROFF, BODY OF POWER, SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE: THE CULTURE AND
HISTORY OF A SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE (1985); JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE
ARTS OF RESISTANCE (1990).
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clients autonomously defining goals and lawyers determining the
means to achieve them.' 1
In this paper we challenge these views. After studying the en-
actments of power in lawyer-client interactions in divorce, 12 we find
that these interactions run with the great tide of social life rather
than counter to it. Power in these interactions is a complicated phe-
nonomenon that, over time, is constructed and reconstructed so
that its possession is neither necessarily obvious nor rigidly deter-
mined. Indeed, it is probably more accurate to say that power is not
possessed at all. Power is mobile and volatile, and it circulates such
that both lawyer and client can be considered more or less powerful,
even at the same time. 13 Even to describe power as an "it" implies
more of an independent existence than we intend. It is better, per-
haps, to view it as a dimension of relationships rather than a re-
source under someone's control.
In the traditional ideology of professionalism, professionals
maintain control over the production of services. 14 But in the cases
that we observed, the delivery of professional service instead in-
volved complex processes of negotiation between lawyer and client;
processes in which we saw resistance as well as acquiescence, con-
test as well as cooperation, suspicion as well as commitment. These
cases indicate that the services provided by lawyers to clients are
contested and negotiated in the stream of interactions that consti-
tute the professional relationship, and that the content and contours
of the interaction vary considerably from case to case, and from mo-
ment to moment within cases.' 5
In this article we first discuss conventional views of power in
lawyer-client relations. We then summarize our contrasting view of
11 See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
12 In the research on which we base our analysis, we observed divorces over a pe-
riod of thirty-three months in two sites, one in Massachusetts and one in California. We
followed one side in forty cases, ideally from the first lawyer-client interview until the
divorce was final. We followed those cases by observing and tape-recording lawyer-cli-
ent sessions, attending court and mediation hearings and trials, and interviewing both
lawyers and clients about those events. We observed one hundred fifteen lawyer-client
conferences and conducted an equivalent number of interviews. For a more complete
description of the research strategy, see Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and
Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAw & Soc'y REV. 93, 94-99 (1986).
13 We think this is one lesson that can be drawn from Lucie White's analysis of the
case of Mrs. G. See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
14 See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION
OF EXPERT LABOR 10-15 (1989).
15 Our view of power differs significantly from the view prevailing in most literature
on the legal profession. Heinz, for example, believes that the crucial distinction in the
lawyer-client relationship is whether lawyers have the power to modify their clients'
goals and that the lawyer's control over tactics and techniques is both assumed and irrel-
evant. See John P. Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 17 GEO. L. REV. 891, 897 (1983).
1450 [Vol. 77:1447
ENACTMENTS OF POWER
power, which we illustrate through divorce cases. We develop our
view in two important arenas of lawyer-client negotiation: what we
call the "negotiation of reality," or the search for goals; and the "ne-
gotiation of responsibility," or the search for control over case pro-
gress and division of labor. Next, we describe the enactment of
power in both of these areas through analysis of an illustrative case
history. Finally, we estimate the extent to which our view of the ne-
gotiation of power in divorce cases is relevant to more technical and
rule-centered areas of legal practice.
I
CONVENTIONAL VIEWS OF POWER IN LAWYER-CLIENT
RELATIONS
The predominant image of the lawyer-client relationship is one
of professional dominance and lay passivity.1 6 The lawyer governs
the relationship, defines the terms of the interaction, and is respon-
sible for the service provided. The client, in contrast, is the con-
sumer of a service whose quality is difficult to evaluate.1 7 Studies of
a wide range of legal situations and types of legal practices bolster
this image. For example, Hunting and Neuwirth, writing more than
thirty years ago, found that the majority of litigants in automobile
accident claims in New York City had no idea what their lawyers
were doing in their cases and had no say in when to settle or how
much to accept.18 Legal services lawyers studied by Hosticka rarely
even asked their clients what they wanted them to do.19 Such law-
yers habitually engage in maneuvers that "exploit and reinforce cli-
ent dependency on the lawyer's specialized knowledge and technical
skill."' 20 Kritzer's review of a national survey of lawyers and clients
16 See ZENON BANKOWSKI & GEOFF MUNGHAM, IMAGES OF LAW 111 (1976); HOWARD
S. BECKER, The Nature of a Profession, in SOCIOLOGICAL WORK 96-97 (Howard S. Becker
ed., 1970); TERENCEJ.JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER 53 (1972); Clark D. Cunning-
ham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2463, 2465
(1989); Heinz, supra note 15, at 892.
17 On the idea of client as consumer, see Rick S. Carlson, Measuring the Quality of
Legal Services: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, II LAW & Soc'Y REV. 287 (1976); Ralph
Nader, Consumerism and Legal Services: The Merging of Movements, II LAW & Soc'Y REV. 247
(1976); see also John Griffiths, What Do Dutch Lawyers Actually Do In Divorce Cases?, 20 LAw
& Soc'Y REV. 135, 155 (1986) (finding that "clients make a fairly passive impression,
asking few questions, showing little interest in the procedural and legal aspects of their
divorce, and manifesting little inclination to use legal strategies in their conflict with
their spouse.").
18 ROBERT HUNTING & GLORIA NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY? A STUDY
OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CLAIMS 107-09 (1962).
19 See Carl Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What Is
Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. PROBS. 599, 604 (1979).
20 Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Nar-
rative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107, 2132 (1991).
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in litigated cases found low client involvement in case development
and strategy. 21 From these studies one might think that contempo-
rary lawyers fulfill Bakunin's 19th century prediction about scientific
intelligence, namely, that it would lead to an aristocratic, despotic,
arrogant and elitist regime. 22
Indeed, even where clients are involved in the management of
their own cases, their involvement often is limited. Thus, Rosen-
thal's notion of a high level of client participation in personal injury
litigation is confined in its interactive dimensions to expressing spe-
cial concerns and making follow-up demands for attention. 23 Law-
yers resent and resist the few clients who take an active role in their
cases, considering them hostile and problematic rather than helpful
and persistent.24 In the conventional wisdom, people have
"problems" and experts have "solutions." 25
There is, however, a less polemical view, one that is more relia-
ble as a general view of the profession because it is more sensitive to
context. 26 Spangler, for example, reports that private practitioners
and corporate counsel are less likely to dictate action to their clients
than are legal services lawyers. 27 Heinz and Laumann recognize
that there is considerable variation, by area of law, in the practice
characteristic they term "freedom of action,"28 a notion reflecting
the lawyer's unilateral power to decide on strategy and operate free
of close client supervision.29
While these scholars see variation in enactments of power by
area of practice, others have found it on a case-by-case basis.30 Still
21 HERBERT KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS & ORDINARY LITIGATION 66
(1990).
22 See CHARLES DERBER ET AL., POWER IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE: PROFESSIONALS AND
THE RISE OF A NEW MANDARIN ORDER 5 (1990).
23 See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 33 (1974).
24 See Hosticka, supra note 19, at 607.
25 IVAN ILLICH, DISABLING PROFESSIONS 11 (1978).
26 See HUBERTJ. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES: A STUDY OF INFOR-
MAL PRESSURES IN PRIVATE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 3 (1963).
27 See EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE 166-67, 170 (1986).
28 See JOHN HEINZ & EDWARD 0: LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE OF THE BAR 108-09 (1982).
29 See id. at 104. The comparative aspect of the Heinz and Laumann findings must
be treated with some care, since the data are two steps removed from actual behavior.
Heinz and Laumann did not observe lawyers exercising "freedom of action"; nor did
they interview lawyers or their clients about what went on between them. Instead they
used a panel of law professors and social researchers to rate this characteristic for thirty
fields of service. See id. at 30.
30 See Maureen Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the Client, 7 INT'LJ. SOC. LAW 331
(1979). Cain notes that the array of power between lawyer and client varies from client
to client: the solicitors she observed adopted their clients' goals as the given agenda
unless they had a conflict of interest or the clients exhibited unreal expectations. Id. at
342-51. Macaulay's careful analysis of the range of transformative effects that lawyers
have on clients' goals contrasts with the picture presented by Cain. See Stewart Macau-
1452 [Vol. 77:1447
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other researchers find power distributed between lawyer and client
according to task.3' Finally, other analysts suggest that power in the
professional relationship directly reflects control over resources.
Thus Flood, having observed the history of two lawsuits in his eth-
nographic study of a large Chicago law firm, suggests that the allo-
cation of power between lawyer and client depends on whether
clients are likely to produce repeat business or pay fees that com-
mand attention.3 2 Abel is perhaps the strongest proponent of this
view. He argues that corporate clients are typically the "dominant"
lay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 115 (1979). It is unclear
whether the difference reflects differences in American and British practice or differ-
ences in the sensitivity of legally trained and lay observers. The low frequency of clients
exhibiting "inappropriate" behavior in Cain's data suggests that the cases she observed
were considerably more straightforward than those generally encountered by American
lawyers. In the same vein, Bottoms and McClean find that the extent of participation of
criminal defendants in their cases varies by culture, personality and ideology. See
ANTHONY E. BOTTOMS &J.D. McCLEAN, DEFENDANTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 69, 232
(1976).
O'Gorman's role division into counselors and advocates implies a correlative active
or passive part in devising client goals and tactics. See O'GORMAN, supra note 26, at 132,
134. He sees a causal relationship, dependent on degree of specialization, between pro-
fessional security and tolerance of client direction. The less secure the lawyer, the
greater the control he (almost all of his subjects were men) is willing to cede to the
client. Id. at 145.
31 Reminiscent ofJohnson's distinction between defining needs and the manner of
fulfilling them, work on large law firms indicates that even though corporations set goals
and policy independent of lawyer influence, lawyers have a major say in tactical matters.
Moreover, Rueschemeyer believes that American lawyers are more closely in tune with
their clients' orientations than are continental lawyers whose roles are explicitly defined
and whose personal contact with clients is less frequent. See JOHNSON, supra note 16, at
46-47; ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS wrrH POWER 264 (1988); SPANGLER, supra note 27,
at 60-61, 64. See also DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETv 112 (1973).
32 See John A. Flood, Anatomy of Lawyering: An Ethnography of a Corporate Law
Firm 386-90 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University (Evans-
ton)). In a similar vein, Olson summarizes studies that find client participation in several
countries to vary directly with their socio-economic status. SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS
AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS 131-35 (1984). See SUSAN R.
THOMAS BUCKLE & LEONARD G. BUCKLE, BARGAINING FOR JUSTICE: CASE DISPOSITION
AND REFORM IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS 25 (1977); JOEL E. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAw REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 25 (1978);
O'GORMAN, supra note 26, at 58-59; ROMAN TOMASIC, LAWYERS AND THE COMMUNITY 99
(1978); John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation in Eng-
land, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 295-96 (1979); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a
Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, I LAw & Soc'y REV. 28-38 (1967);
William L.F. Felstiner, Plea Contracts in West Germany, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 321 (1979).
But seeJEROME CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 166 (1966) (lawyers with low-status clients are
subject to more client pressures to violate ethical norms); FRANK SORAUF, THE WALL OF
SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES OF CHURCH AND STATE 155 (1976) (factors
other than socio-economic status important in explaining client participation in church-
state litigation); Jack Katz, Legality and Equality: Plea Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-
Collar and Common Crimes, 13 LAw & Soc'y REV. 447 (1979) (suggests significance of
crime type in explaining client participation in plea bargaining).
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actors in lawyer-client relationships, while solo and small-firm prac-
titioners "dominate" their clients.33
Two things should be noted about conventional views of power
in lawyer-client relationships. First, these views are basically struc-
tural: they suggest that power varies by status, economic resources,
field of law, or the vagaries of particular clients. 34 Second, they treat
power as a "thing" possessed at one time or another by one of the
parties to a lawyer-client relationship. As we see it, power in lawyer-
client interactions is less stable, predictable, and clear-cut than the
conventional view holds. Power is not a "thing" to be possessed; it
is continuously enacted and re-enacted, constituted and re-
constituted. The enactments and constitution are subtle and shift-
ing; they can be observed only through close attention to the
microdynamics of individual lawyer-client encounters.
II
ENACTMENTS OF POWER IN DIVORCE CASES
In the divorce lawyer's office two worlds come together:3 5 the
legal world for which the lawyer speaks and to which he provides
access36 and the social world of the client, beset with urgent emo-
tional demands, complex and changing relationships, and unmet fi-
nancial needs.3 7 Just as the legal world appears arcane and
ritualized to the uninitiated, the world of the client is one to which
the lawyer has access in only a limited, very mediated way. When
lawyer and client interact, each confronts, in the world the other
inhabits, something new and opaque, yet something of indisputable
relevance to their relationship.
To each, the hidden world of the other becomes known mostly
through reciprocal accounts.38 This means that lawyer-client inter-
action is a process of story-telling39 and interrogation in which law-
33 See RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 204 (1989).
34 The picture of client participation is composed of conflicting as well as conver-
gent strands for two very different reasons. The people whose behavior is analyzed are
very different personally, demographically, and institutionally from each other. The
other reason that the picture of lawyer-client interaction is so varied is that the data
come from such different sources. The ability to identify and comprehend the content of
dyadic relationships like those between lawyers and clients varies widely when the infor-
mation is secured through national surveys, structured interviews, open-ended inter-
views, telephone interviews, mail questionnaires, case studies, file reviews, participant-
observation, or longitudinal observation.
35 See Griffiths, supra note 17, at 152-55.
36 See Austin W. Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law
Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE LJ. 1663, 1671-84 (1990).
37 See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 12, at 117-24.
38 Marvin B. Scott & Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 AM. Soc. REV. 46 (1968).
39 For an interesting discussion of the value of attending to stories in the legal pro-
cess, see Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword, Symposium of Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV.
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yer and client seek to produce for each other a satisfying rendition
of her distinctive world. What each accepts as "real" in the these
accounts is negotiated, implicitly as well as explicitly, and frequently
transformed over the course of their interaction.40 Negotiating a
version that overlaps and is treated as a joint product is essential if
lawyers and clients are to construct a mutually tolerable story that is
likely to be persuasive to the other side or to a judge.
Making a landfall in the treacherous waters of each other's
world can be a threatening experience for both lawyers and clients.
In the world of law, unknown rules and people operating in forbid-
ding surroundings and through alien processes can influence or de-
cide matters of great moment to clients: child custody, the rights of
a non-custodial parent, the disposition of the family home, the divi-
sion of property and income. In the social world of the client, the
lawyer's professional skills may be severely tested by the client's
guilt about marriage failure, unresolved feelings for the spouse,
continuing and often irritating disputes over children and money, or
by a new relationship whose relevance to the divorce may not be
acknowledged. 41 Even when the lawyer tries to keep it at bay, the
social world of the client is continually present.42
For both lawyer and client the stakes are high in what the other
knows and reveals. While the client must rely on the lawyer's legal
experience, the lawyer is largely dependent on the client's interpre-
tations of her social world. For both, motives, goals and data may
be suppressed by plan or inadvertence. 43 Each may consciously
adopt a narrative style and rules of relevance that limit what the
other can assimilate.44 They may each say both more and less than
they intend as they explain what they want the other to know.
Although lawyers and clients are highly dependent on each
other, the stories they tell about their interactions are tales of suspi-
cion and doubt. Clients are suspicious about the depth of commit-
ment lawyers bring to their cases and their own ability to control the
content and timing of their lawyers' actions. They worry about law-
yers who are too busy to attend fully to the idiosyncracies of their
cases, and about divided loyalties, competence, judgment and per-
2073 (1989); see also LANCE BENNETr & MARTHA FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN
THE COURTROOM 3 (1981).
40 See Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of
Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAw & Soc'y REV. 737 (1988).
41 See JANET JOHNSTON & LINDA CAMPBELL, IMPASSES OF DIVORCE: THE DYNAMICS
AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 102 (1988); CATHERINE RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK:
WOMEN AND MEN MAKE SENSE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 121-22 (1990).
42 Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 40, at 744-52.
43 Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, 50 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
473 (1956); SCOTT, supra note 10, at 4-5.
44 See Cunningham, supra note 16, at 2491; White, supra note 13, at 21-32.
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sonality. Lawyers, on the other hand, are concerned because they
have to deal with and depend on people who are likely to be emo-
tionally agitated, in the midst of a profound personal crisis, ambiva-
lent about divorce, determined to hurt their spouse, and misguided
about what they can expect from the divorce process. 45
These concerns lead to responses that themselves produce sec-
ondary problems. Lawyers worried about the emotional instability
of their clients often appear hyper-rational, detached, disloyal, and
callous. 46 Clients, put off and alienated by such appearances, ap-
pear even more unstable and unpredictable to their lawyers. Law-
yers worry about distortions introduced into client accounts and
attempt to test client stories without expressing overt skepticism.
Recognizing this combination of mutual dependency and suspi-
cion has enormous, and previously unexamined, consequences for
the way scholars understand the exercise of power in lawyer-client
relations. In the standard analysis of the profession, lawyers are
presented either as agents moving tactically toward their clients'
clearly expressed goals, as principals paternalistically operating in
accordance with their sense of the clients' best interests, or as op-
portunists using the clients' cases to work out their own agendas.47
Given these very different images of lawyers, it is natural to pose
Rosenthal's well-known question, "Who's In Charge?" 48 However,
asking "who's in charge" implies both that a single, stable answer
can be provided, and that the possessor of power can be clearly
identified.
We think that neither is the case. Both lawyers and clients are
sometimes frustrated by feelings of powerlessness in dealing with
the other,49 and such feelings must be taken seriously. Often no
one may be in charge. Interactions between lawyers and clients in-
volve as much drift and uncertainty as they do direction and clarity
of purpose. It may be difficult, at any one moment, to determine
who, if anyone, is defining the objectives, determining strategy, or
devising tactics.
Power in lawyer-client relationships would not be so ambiguous
if it were just an attribute of position, or if it could be captured by
attending simply to offices, roles and forms. Whether in lawyer-cli-
ent interactions or elsewhere, however, power does not exist
outside of particular social interactions. It is always generated from
45 See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 12, at 105-07, 117-20.
46 See Griffiths, supra note 17, at 148-49.
47 For two different images, see JONATHAN CASPER, LAWYERS BEFORE THE WARREN
COURT: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1957-66 at 194 (1972); DERBER ET AL., supra
note 22, at 140.
48 See ROSENTHAL, supra note 23.
49 See White, supra note 13.
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the inside in a continuing series of situated assertions and rejoin-
ders, by claims and responses to those claims, and by particular ges-
tures and the resistance those gestures provoke.50 It is not like a
tool sitting on a shelf, waiting to be picked up and applied to the
task at hand. Power, rather, is enacted and constituted moment-by-
moment. It is seen in indirect moves and sleights-of-hand, in rup-
tures and ellipses, and in what is left unsaid and unacknowledged as
well as in forceful, continuous and overt assertion.51
Power is continuously produced in the regular and apparently
uneventful routines and practices that comprise most social interac-
tions. But it is also conditioned by the cultural resources that partic-
ular lawyers and clients bring to their relationships. Even when it
seems robust and irresistible, power may be fragile and contested. 52
Each of the social interactions through which power is constituted
has its own distinctive history and its own particular future. In this
sense power is always created anew and, like any newborn, its pro-
gress and outcome is uncertain.
The malleability of power, however, does not mean that the re-
spective positions of lawyer and client are decided by a coin toss, or
that they are open to limitless development at the start of every ses-
sion. Lawyer-client interaction always occurs in the space of law.55
For the lawyer, this means that interaction takes place in a familiar
space, a space of privilege. The books on the lawyer's shelves are
books the lawyer has read or knows how to read; the language spo-
ken is a language in which lawyers are trained and with which they
are comfortable; the rituals performed give special place to the law-
yer even as they are forbidding and unwelcoming to the uninitiated.
Thus, following de Certeau's formulation, lawyers are able to act
"strategically" in relation to their clients; that is, they act "in a place
that can be circumscribed as proper and thus serve as the basis for
generating relations with an exterior distinct from it.' ' 54 For the cli-
ent, on the other hand, the space of law is unfamiliar and forbid-
ding. In such a space the client's enactments of power are, in de
Certeau's sense, "tactical." 55
50 See DE CERTEAU, supra note 8, at xvii-xx.
51 See ScorT, supra note 10, at ch. 2.
52 See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, MARXISM AND LrrERATURE 112 (1977). Williams argues
that power "does not exist passively as a form of dominance. It has continually to be
renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, al-
tered, challenged by pressures not all its own."
53 For an interesting exploration of this spatial metaphor, see Thomas L. Dumm,
Fear of Law, 10 STUD. IN L., POL. & Soc. 29, 34 (1990).
54 DE CERTEAU, supra note 8, at xix.
55 A tactic insinuates itself into the other's place, fragmentarily, without tak-
ing it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance. It has
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Here, as in each moment and location in society, there is a lim-
ited reservoir of possibility defined by history and habit. The possi-
ble enactments of power are situationally and organizationally
circumscribed in ways that advantage some people or groups and
disadvantage others. 56 To understand these limits, and the patterns
with which they are associated, we must attend to the nature of pro-
fessional projects and privileges, as well as to their connections to
legal institutions, the meaning of divorce in society and the preroga-
tives of class, race and gender. Yet the lawyer is never solely in con-
trol of the production of legal services, and the client is never simply
a timid consumer. Consumption of legal services is itself another
domain of production. 57 As a result, the particular evolution of any
lawyer-client interaction in divorce must be situated in the history
and culture from which both parties drw when they enact their spe-
cific plays of power.58
Power has many dimensions and is enacted in many domains.
It involves interpreting the past, defining the present, and setting an
agenda for the future. It is enacted in the domain of knowledge and
understanding, in crafting definitions of situations and assigning
meanings to them, as well as in the domain of action and behavior. 59
In legal affairs, the conceptual domain may be as important as the
behavioral. As a consequence, we chose to illustrate enactments of
power in both domains. In the next section we report how lawyers
and clients negotiate a working definition of "reality." We consider,
in particular, the strategies and tactics employed as they identify and
settle on the goals that will be their joint objectives in the legal pro-
cess of divorce. In a later section, we describe strategic and tactical
enactments of power as lawyers and clients negotiate responsibility,
and we examine struggles about who is going to do what in the case,
and who is responsible for keeping it moving.
at its disposal no base where it can capitalize on its advantages, prepare
its expansions, and secure independence with respect to circumstances.
Id.
56 For a useful example, see Barbara Yngvesson, Making Law At the Doorway: The
Clerk, the Court and the Construction of Community in a New England Town, 22 LAw & Soc'y
REv. 409 (1988).
57 As de Certeau argues, "The latter is devious, it is dispersed, but it insinuates
itself everywhere, silently and almost invisibly . . . through its ways of using prod-
ucts .... . DE CERTEAU, supra note 8, at xii-xiii.
58 Id.
59 See MICHEL FouCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 109 (1972).
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III
ENACTMENTS OF POWER AND THE NEGOTIATION OF
REALITY
In the world of no-fault divorce, the legal process formally has
limited functions-dividing assets and future income, fixing custody
and visitation, and, occasionally, protecting physical safety and
property.60 Lawyers must understand their client's objectives con-
cerning these issues. But determination of clients' interests is a
known quagmire.61 Clients may not know what they want or may
not want what they ought to want. They may change their minds in
unpredictable ways, or they may not change their minds when they
ought to do so. Clients may be insufficiently self-conscious, or
plagued by false consciousness. Moreover, they may find it difficult
to distinguish between lawyers who are trying to impose their vision
of client needs on clients and lawyers who are trying to get clients to
share a vision of those needs that is not controlled by the power of
the lawyer's professional position.62
When it comes to defining goals, lawyers generally are permis-
sive. That is, they are intensely concerned that the client adopt
"reasonable" goals, but within the rather broad parameters of that
notion, lawyers are not directive.63 For divorce lawyers and their
clients, the realm of "reality" is the realm of the possible. Within
that realm, the final choice is generally left to the client.6 However,
before that choice can be made, considerable energy is devoted to
the construction of a mutually acceptable account of the reality of
divorce. Defining and identifying "realistic" goals, and orienting
and reconciling clients to the world of the legally possible, occurs
60 See HERBERTJACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 7-8 (1988); LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION:
THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA C. 2 (1985).
61 See Kenneth Kressel et. al., Professional Intervention in Divorce: A Summary of the Views
of Lawyers, Psychotherapists and Clergy, 2J. DIVORCE 119 (1978).
62 See William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469
(1984). These difficulties, at first glance rather straightforward, have been built by Si-
mon into an elegant set of distinctions between conservative, liberal and critical "visions
of practice".
63 Lawyers frequently exert considerable pressure on their own clients to be
reasonable. When possible they cooperate with the lawyer for the other
party in seeking to get their respective clients to agree to a reasonable
settlement. They use all sorts of ad hoc tactics to try to bring about a
'reasonable divorce.' But the key to their role is a common strategy from
which they seldom diverge: the maintenance of a stance of relative
neutrality.
Griffiths, supra note 17, at 166.
64 For a contrasting view, see William H. Simon, Lawyer's Advice and Client Autonomy:
Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991).
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during complex negotiations in which struggle, if not overt conflict,
is frequent.
The mutual construction of reality takes two forms in divorce
cases. On the one hand, lawyer and client may develop, over time, a
set of goals and tactics that capitalize on the lawyer's knowledge of
the legal world and the client's knowledge of her own social world.
The final version of what is real is not dictated by one or the other,
but built by them together without the need for either to alter the
other's view in many important respects. On the other hand, lawyer
and client may not see reality in converging terms and each may
seek to defend and/or advance his particular vision.65 Developing a
mutually satisfying sense of what reasonably can be expected or
achieved is at the heart of the complex lawyer-client interactions we
observed. 66 Yet that sense is not so concrete and tangible that, once
achieved, it can be taken for granted and easily maintained. It is
always in danger of slipping away as events from the client's social
world intrude into the deliberations, and as lawyer and client to-
gether gather information about the goals, expectations and strate-
gies of their adversaries.
In examining the ongoing and fragile negotiation of reality be-
tween lawyers and clients, we focus first on the factors that "distort"
reality for lawyers and clients, and then on the strategies and tactics
employed to promote particular versions of reality. Clients, of
course, have greater difficulty than lawyers in becoming oriented to
the world of the legally possible.67 Some of the difficulty is obvious.
Emotionally off-balance, angry, depressed, anxious or agitated, they
may have trouble understanding what they are told, believing the
information that they get and focusing on the alternatives that are
presented to them.68 They may be impelled to strike at or "pay
back" their spouse in ways that are inconsistent with reality and
even, by altering the posture of the other side, make their goals
more difficult to attain.
Second, clients may expect more of the legal system than it can
deliver under even the best of circumstances. 69 Unrealistic expecta-
65 Often this clash of views is not made explicit. See White, supra note 13, at 46-48.
66 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979). While Mnookin and Kornhauser's notion of
"bargaining in the shadow of law" refers to bargaining between the opposing sides in a
divorce, it might equally well apply to relations between lawyers and their own clients.
67 See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTOR-
NEYS AT WORK ch.3 (1985); Blumberg, supra note 32, at 32; Macaulay, supra note 30, at
159-60.
68 See JOHNSTON & CAMPBELL, supra note 41, at chs.4-5.
69 On the nature of citizen expectations of the legal system, see SALLY MERRY, GET-
TINGJUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMER-
ICANS 179 (1990).
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tions may range from saving the marriage to transforming the
spouse, but they are most likely to be centered on financial affairs.
Clients tend to reason up from needs, rather than down from re-
sources, and they have great difficulty in dealing with the gap be-
tween the two. Additionally, clients are slow to realize that many
legal entitlements are not self-executing.70 Thejudge at the hearing
on temporary support may say that the client is entitled to $100 a
week, but that does not guarantee that the client will receive any-
thing. Many clients are naive about their own financial needs, and
may have to be patiently educated by their lawyers. Some clients
have difficulty grasping the limits of what is possible because they
cannot believe that the law actually is as it actually is. Finally, clients
are slow to understand the costs of achieving their objectives. Vin-
dication, the last dollar of support, meticulous estimates of property
value, a neat and precise division of property, a visitation scheme
that covers a very wide range of contingencies, and equitable ar-
rangements that govern the future as well as the present may be
theoretically possible, but even approximations require extensive
services that middle-class clients generally cannot afford.
Lawyers, of course, are less encumbered on the legal side in
developing a view of reality in particular cases. Nevertheless, it is
not all clear sailing for them. There are, for instance, three kinds of
information problems. In order to form a view of the possible they
may need to know things that clients sometimes cannot tell them.
These include client goals7 1 as well as things that clients sometimes
will not tell them, such as their feelings. In addition, there are
things that clients sometimes try to tell lawyers that lawyers do not
recognize or understand. 72 For example, in a case that we previ-
ously analyzed at some length, the client could not decide whether
she wanted to settle or litigate, and could not make the lawyer un-
derstand that she had great difficulty in negotiating a settlement
with her spouse because she could not trust him to fulfill any com-
mitments that he made.73
It would, however, be a mistake when thinking about divorce
cases to assume that clients are emotional cripples and that the per-
sonalities, problems and politics of lawyers do not interfere with
their ability to define reality and/or respond to their clients' defini-
70 See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 23 (1974).
71 For a discussion of the rationales for imputing goals to clients who do not, or
cannot, articulate them, see David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Professional, 1981 Wis.
L. REv. 454.
72 See Simon, supra note 62, at 221; see also Alfieri, supra note 20, at 2123-24; Cun-
ningham, supra note 16, at 2464-65.
73 Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 12, at 111, 121.
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tions.74 Lawyers may not be astute, attentive or experienced
enough to catch the client's message. 75 In addition, they may be so
overworked or so worn down by practice that they do not have the
patience or stamina to negotiate effectively with their clients.
However serious the distortions in the lawyer's grasp of the le-
gally possible, the difficulties they face in determining social reality,
in determining what is socially possible, are more serious. The law-
yer's ability to interpret the social world of the client depends on the
raw information they receive from clients, the interpretations that
clients present, and the interpretations or re-interpretations that
lawyers themselves make. All of these steps are complicated and
pose difficulties for lawyers. 76 Occasionally, information is
presented without an overt interpretation. For example, a client
may simply state, "He did not give me money for tuition." More
often, however, the information the client does provide is reconsti-
tuted through the client's experience and perception of self into
highly interpreted material: "He had no interest at all in furthering
my education." Often the client's presentations are influenced by
emotional and financial stakes, or are incomplete or conflicted. The
nature of client communications means that lawyers must continu-
ally sift through and evaluate the social world presented by the cli-
ent in order to reconstruct a picture of the world that they can
effectively use in promoting the client's interests. 77 In this effort
they may, from time to time, be assisted by information that comes
from other sources, such as opposing counsel or relevant docu-
ments. For the most part, however, lawyers must depend on their
own experience and judgment.78
Lawyers use an array of strategies to try to persuade their cli-
ents to adopt a particular definition of reality. Of course, their
knowledge of legal rules and process, and the information that they
have about specific players, such as other lawyers, judges and
mediators, provide powerful arguments. 79 Unless they have been
74 Some lawyers may be so committed to a particular political perspective on di-
vorce that they do not easily recognize clients who are uneasy about or reluctant to
endorse such a program. Alfieri calls this phenomena "pre-understanding." See Alfieri,
supra note 20, 2123-24. "Pre-understanding is a method of social construction that op-
erates by applying a standard narrative reading to a client's story." Id. at 2123.
75 See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 7
(1990).
76 See Alfieri, supra note 20, at 2131-45 (describing techniques that lawyers can use
to get a fuller grasp of the client's social world).
77 See id.; see also Cunningham, supra note 16, at 2482-83. For a discussion of the
techniques of sifting, see DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 104-23 (1977).
78 See Alfieri, supra note 20, at 2131.
79 See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990).
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through the process before, clients' only sources of information
about the nature and limits of divorce law are their own lawyer and
anecdotes related by their family and friends. In addition to their
feel for the legal system and for the dramatis personae, lawyers, partic-
ularly specialists in family law, benefit from their experiences in
prior cases. Having "heard it all before," they frequently interpret
the behavior of the spouse and his or her lawyer with some accuracy,
looking beyond words and positions articulated to more fundamen-
tal concerns.8 0
Still, many divorce lawyers use their knowledge and experience
in a manipulative way.81 The most common technique is to engage
in what we call "law talk."18 2 Law talk consists of the conversations
that lawyers and clients have about the legal system, legal process,
rules, hearings, trials, judges, other lawyers and the other lawyer in
the case. In general, we have found law talk to be a form of cynical
realism through which the legal system and its actors are trashed on
various accounts, frequently in an exaggerated fashion. The pur-
pose of this rhetorical style is usually to convince the client that the
legal process is risky business, that legal justice is different from so-
cial justice, and that clients can only achieve reasonable certainty at
a reasonable cost, and maintain some control over a divorce, by ne-
gotiating a settlement with the other side.
Even when it takes the form of hyperbole, law talk is not com-
monly introduced into lawyer-client conversations in an aggressive
way. Lawyers often join with their clients' positions and appear, at
least initially, to be sympathetic. They introduce their clients to re-
ality by invoking their own understanding of legal norms and their
own expectations about what courts would do were they to go
before a judge.8 3 Clients are told that it does not make sense to
"insist on something that is far out of line from what a court would
do."
Lawyers use delay and circular conversation to convey messages
about what is legally realistic. They engage in a form of passive
resistance, maintaining the form of the agency relationship while
subtly altering its substance. Rarely are expectations overtly
branded as unrealistic in a judgmental sense; instead, most lawyers
patiently, but insistently, remind their clients of the constraints that
80 Luban, supra note 71, at 454.
81 For similar observations in a different context, see Alfieri, supra note 20, at 2123-
30.
82 Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 36, at 1671.
83 See Simon, supra note 64, at 214-16.
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the law imposes on both of them, that is, of law's definition of
reality.8 4
The behavior of clients mirrors that of their lawyers. Expecta-
tions about lawyer performance are generally not made explicit.
Clients rarely specify what they want their lawyers to do or how they
want their lawyers to behave.8 5 In fact, one of the chief difficulties
with which lawyers and clients must contend is their mutual aversion
to confrontation. In the face of continued client demands for the
unreasonable, lawyers restate technical or strategic difficulties, try to
recast reasonable goals into acceptable outcomes, or simply change
the subject. They do not, however, directly tell their clients that
they are being unreasonable.8 6
In the face of lawyers' insistence that they accommodate them-
selves to the reality of what the law allows, clients generally persist,
at least initially, in expounding their needs, explaining their notions
of justice, or reiterating their objectives. But rarely do they insist
that their lawyer make a particular demand, argue a particular posi-
tion, or even endorse their view. Where dissatisfaction is great, the
usual client response is exit rather than voice.8 7
Although law talk is the divorce lawyer's basic device in efforts
to reorient her clients' views of reality, others include rhetorical
flourishes, technical language and role manipulation. Perhaps pro-
ceeding from experience in the law school classroom, some lawyers
conjure up a "parade of horribles." In this scenario, clients are in-
formed that if they continue to seek one goal or another, they will
suffer a series of negative consequences of continuing and mounting
severity. Alternatively, lawyers tell stories about other clients who
have persisted in similar courses of action, pursued understandable
but unrealistic objectives, and suffered disastrous results.
While technical language is rarely used as a strategy to confuse
a client or make him feel dependent on professional expertise, cli-
ents report to us that it has this effect nonetheless. Some lawyers
invest, or try to invest, their views with added persuasive authority
by puffing up their status in the legal community. They cast them-
selves as the "dean" of the divorce bar, or as one of its most exper-
ienced and astute practitioners, or as an insider with special access
84 See Griffiths, supra note 17, at 160:
Lawyers rarely present something as their own opinion. Their steering of
the discussion and persuading of clients are largely presented in terms of
the formal and practical margins set by the legal system, by the law and
more particularly by the decisions that can be expected from the local
court.
85 See Simon, supra note 64, at 215; see also White, supra note 13, at 46-48.
86 See Griffiths, supra note 17, at 160.
87 See generally ALBERT HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970).
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to the judge and other functionaries. A rather striking example of
the latter comes from a Massachusetts case:
Now I think I have a good reputation with the Registrar of Pro-
bate here. Judge Murdoch is married to, no, what am I saying,
Judge Murdoch's sister is married to Bob's wife. My God, try
again. His sister is Bob's wife. They talk all the time. Bob likes me
very, very much. We get along very, very well. And I have a good
reputation in this court and I think it is going to get through to
the Judge.
In addition, most lawyers keep their clients at a social distance.
Particularly in California, where we found that clients often consult
a therapist as well as a lawyer during divorce, lawyers work hard to
restrict their efforts to the legal side of divorce and leave the per-
sonal difficulties to someone else. The exceptions, however, are
striking. One lawyer in Massachusetts routinely engages in behavior
common among friends, but rare in lawyer-client interaction. She
reveals extraordinary biographical detail to her clients, talking at
length about her own divorce, health, finances, housing and the eat-
ing habits of her children. This lawyer violates the standard under-
standings of professional distance, becoming friend and therapist as
well as legal adviser.88 These multiple roles enable the lawyer who
adopts them to use therapeutic moves and appeals to friendship to
shape her clients' definitions of reality and blunt any critique of her
performance.
Clients are more limited in the resources that they can mobilize
to persuade lawyers to accept their view of reality.8 9 Their inherent
advantage is their knowledge of their spouse and generally superior
ability to estimate the spouse's reaction to offers or demands. Law-
yers are sensitive to this comparative advantage and often try to ex-
ploit it. As one lawyer put it in speaking with one of his clients:
Let me ask you this, because you know him a lot better. Which do
you think he'd be more likely to give a good response to? Some-
thing that's in writing, that he needs to respond to in writing, or
something oral?
Or, as another stated,
That's what I'm inclined to do here, unless you're of the opinion
you would rather start at sixty-forty. I mean, you know Joan and
you know how she would react.
In the latter instance the lawyer is even prepared to alter her fa-
vored pattern of negotiation in the face of the client's superior
88 For a discussion of various roles that lawyers play in divorce, see O'GORMAN,
supra note 26, at ch.6.
89 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: the Story ofJosephine V., 4 GEo.J. LEGAL
ETmcs 619 (1991); see also White, supra note 13, at 46-48.
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knowledge. For that instant, the social world of the client, rather
than the world of law and legal experience, defines the parameters
of the reasonable.
In addition to deploying their knowledge of their own social
world, clients frequently assert their views, or resist their lawyers',
through repetition and denial. 90 Lawyers may talk about the unrea-
sonable or the unobtainable, they may predict this or that outcome,
but clients need not, and frequently do not, acquiesce. Rather, cli-
ents may become quiet or change the subject, only to reintroduce
the same topic later. What may seem to the observer to be wasted
motion and circularity, may really be a tactic in an ongoing negotia-
tion. Finally, clients on occasion fight back by withholding informa-
tion, sometimes explicitly, sometimes not.9' They use this tactic
when they want to exclude the lawyer from some field of inquiry,
often because they consider an issue out of bounds or would be em-
barrassed by some disclosure.9 2
The negotiation of reality between lawyer and client is time-
consuming and repetitive, yet often incomplete or unclear in its re-
sults. Whose definition of reality prevails is often impossible to de-
termine. Even as decisions are made and documents are filed, how
those decisions and documents relate to lawyer-client conversations
about goals and expectations can be mysterious. It is, however, pre-
cisely by attending to this mystery that one can understand enact-
ments of power and tactics of resistance.
IV
ENACTMENTS OF POWER AND THE NEGOTIATION OF
RESPONSIBILITY
Unlike the effort to define reasonable and attainable goals, the
task of securing the client's objectives initially appears to be neither
opaque nor ambiguous. The steps that must be taken to get on with
the case are routine. Particular, well-defined procedural require-
ments must be satisfied to secure various kinds of court assistance.
Knowing and executing the necessary steps are conventionally re-
garded as the lawyer's responsibility. 93 Many involve details of pro-
cedure beyond the experience of even the most sophisticated client.
90 Other work emphasizes the way client stories are silenced in lawyer-client inter-
action. Our observations suggest that clients resist the definitions of reality their lawyers
provide through persistent and recurring assertion.
91 See White, supra note 13, at 48-52.
92 See Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?".- Attorney-Client Deliberation
Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REv. 213 (1990).
93 See ROSENTHAL, supra note 23, at 15. This is, of course, subject to the norms of
informed consent. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent
and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41 (1979).
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Most of the remaining steps involve various kinds of negotiations
with the other side. Where the lawyer believes tasks are more easily
or more cheaply carried out by the client himself, such an assign-
ment ought to be straightforward. Some activities are clearly the
exclusive preserve of the lawyer-preparing the pleadings, con-
ducting hearings and trials, for example. However, other aspects of
divorce that can be shared or assigned to the client often are not.
In general, lawyers try to maintain control over negotiations
with the other side, except in discussions about personal property.
They do this by insisting that these negotiations take place on a law-
yer-to-lawyer basis. To lawyers, these professional exchanges are a
core element of legal services in divorce, an arena in which their
professional experience and competence are more nearly actualized
than in helping clients comprehend the legal process or figure out
their financial prospects. Nevertheless, some clients, perhaps fear-
ful that their interests will not be adequately represented, want to
negotiate directly with their spouse.
But whatever the explicit assignments of responsibility, divorce
cases are not self-executing. It is not always clear what needs to be
done, who is going to do it, and who is responsible for assuring that
it gets done. Either lawyer or client might not take the steps that
they ought to take, have agreed to take, or been urged to take. In
this context, enactments of power, either in assuming or assigning
responsibility, are, like those in the negotiation of reality, often un-
clear or confused.
One reason legal action in divorce does not proceed in a clear
and orderly way is simply that individual and organizational agendas
are beyond the control of any single party to the case.94 However,
the divorces that we observed suggest that the fundamental reason
cases do not proceed steadily or smoothly is that lawyers and clients
on the same side encounter, from each other, various levels of pro-
crastination, vacillation, disapproval, withdrawal, repression, and in-
formation problems that delay, distort and jeopardize what they are
trying to accomplish.95 These moves involve indirect enactments of
power and indirect tactics of resistance.9 6 Rarely do lawyers or cli-
ents acknowledge that they are not going to do what they said they
would do, or that they are repressing their inclination to say some-
94 For an illustration in another area of law, see TOM DURKIN, ET AL., PLAITED CUN-
NING: MANIPULATING TIME IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION (American Bar Foundation Working
Paper No. 9004, 1991).
95 In the literature on client counselling and interviewing these phenomena are
treated as symptoms of client misbehavior rather than recognized as tactics of resistance.
See DAVID A. BINDER, ET AL., LAWYERS As COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
237-56 (1991).
96 See Scorr, supra note 10, at 29-33.
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thing they are not going to say. The effect of these covert enact-
ments of power becomes manifest only after a price has been paid,
and these enactments are more powerful on that account.97
One of the surprising aspects of the lawyer-client relationship
in divorce proceedings is the rarity of the imperative mode. Put
quite starkly, clients almost never say to their lawyers something on
the order of "I am the client, I am paying the bill, now do this." 98
This finding is not a comment about a form of speech. It is not that
clients just find a more diplomatic way of issuing a command.
Rather, in the face of disagreement, clients do not assert their pre-
rogative to tell the lawyer what to do. Such a finding would not be
so remarkable if the professional in question possessed scientific or
technological expertise, such that a lay person would be out of order
were he to issue commands against the professional's technical
judgment. However, in the context of divorce, many of the judg-
ments over which conflicts occur do not reflect technical considera-
tions; rather, they are questions of timing, motive and interpretation
for which the lawyer may have no comparative advantage. Indeed,
insofar as the resolution of those questions depends upon a feel for
the behavior of the spouse, the client's qualifications may well be
superior.
Lawyers are no more inclined to. command than are their cli-
ents.99 They may urge, cajole, flatter, use rhetorical tricks, provide
unqualified or contingent advice, predict harm, discomfort, frustra-
tion or catastrophe, but they almost never say, "I am the profes-
sional, I am the expert, now do this." Furthermore, although
lawyers frequently fail to act, they rarely invoke their knowledge and
experience as grounds for refusing to act.
The avoidance of imperative modes suggests that the expres-
sive forms used are intuitively sound. Both lawyers and clients ap-
parently recognize that, were they to behave as if they were
hierarchically empowered, they would undermine the legitimacy of
what is generally considered to be a cooperative enterprise.100 But
sound as the conventional forms may be for defining the limits of
overt power, an unwillingness to issue commands opens a wide ter-
ritory for subtle and latent maneuver.
97 Id. at 202-03.
98 This is, of course, the case where the client is not paying the bill, as in the legal
services context. We were surprised that it was also true in the fee-for-service context.
99 For a discussion of different understandings of the lawyer's right to command,
see William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. L. REv. 29 (1978).
100 Some scholars argue that the prevailing cultural form is hierarchical. See, e.g.,
Simon, supra note 62, at 485.
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As in many human endeavors in which progress is not exter-
nally imposed or organized, procrastination in divorce cases is fre-
quently the weapon of choice.' 0 ' Almost all of the actions that need
to be taken to move a case from initiation to conclusion can easily be
avoided. Procrastination may occur when neither lawyer nor client
does anything, although each thinks that the other is committed to
action, and it may occur when the action not taken is concrete and
bounded. Procrastination's effects may be increased by the haze
that eventually settles over the question of who had responsibility in
the first place.
Procrastination may be purposeful and self-conscious. It may
also be structural, built into the way that lawyers organize their prac-
tice. Lawyers in small and medium-sized practices are extremely re-
luctant to turn prospective clients away. As a consequence, they
frequently order their workloads in some form of queue. In the
doctor's office one waits in line to see the doctor. In legal matters,
the wait is not to see the lawyer, but once having seen him, to have
him attend to your case. The outcome of such a regime is clients
who press their lawyers to keep their cases moving, or clients who
are frustrated and angry at the lack of progress.
Additionally, lawyers sometimes lose interest in cases, espe-
cially when the other side is intransigent over settlement and the
client does not have the resources to pay for full-scale adjudication.
Just such a stalemate led a California client to tell us:
I'm hung up over the matter that it's not wound up yet. And no-
body is eager to wind it up ... all the sympathy, but yet on the
other hand they are not concerned about finishing the deal, clos-
ing the book. And I just find that really bizarre for lawyers to be
like that and let it linger on and on. It's like it's stashed in another
pile and I can't figure out why they are not doing anything.
On many occasions, rationalizations for inaction are offered
that may simply excuse poor organization, inattention or bad work
habits. Matters do not receive attention because the lawyer is con-
cerned about provoking the other side, is trying to conserve the cli-
ent's money, or is trying to get the client to take more responsibility
for his own life.
Competing loyalties are another reason for procrastination.
Blumberg's well-known paper, The Practice of Law as a Confidence
Game,10 2 dramatically alerted us to the influence of the work context
on lawyer allegiances. But his theory was developed in the organiza-
101 Power, as is now widely recognized, is exercised in the refusal to act just as surely
as it is involved in assertion. See LUKES, supra note 4, at 23; see also PETER BACHRACH &
MORTON S. BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 43-46 (1970).
102 Blumberg, supra note 32.
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tionally tight confines of a lower criminal court, where defense law-
yers are highly dependent on their continuing relations with judges
and prosecutors. These kinds of continuing relations are inherently
less important in the divorce context. Divorce lawyers in the sites
we studied are most often general practitioners; they practice in
many courts and deal with a shifting cast of actors. Nonetheless,
many of these lawyers went to great lengths to stay on good terms
with the lawyer on the other side, even if this meant not prosecuting
their client's case to the extent they had promised. 10 3
However, procrastination can originate in sound strategy. Law-
yers frequently do not do what they have agreed to do, or implied
they would do, because they disapprove of their client's agenda, dis-
agree over questions of timing, or are deterred by cost. In these
circumstances divorce lawyers are especially affected by their view of
their client's emotional situation. Are the client's emotions under
control? Is he able to function as a reasonable litigant? Has the
psychic divorce kept pace with the legal proceedings, or ought the
latter be delayed until the client achieves a more stable emotional
perspective? 10 4
Clients also may have sound reasons to procrastinate. While
they frequently do not agree with their lawyers, they may not want
to contest the issue with them directly.' 05 A client may be in this
posture because of information she is unwilling to share with the
lawyer, because she may be embarrassed by her own ambivalence,
or because she may be inclined to trust her own, rather than her
lawyer's, judgment or intuition.10 6 Client procrastination may relate
to major as well as minor matters. We observed a client decline to
tell his spouse that he intended to seek a divorce after he assured his
lawyer that he would; another client refused, without explanation, to
authorize service of a divorce petition on the spouse from whom she
repeatedly claimed she wished to be divorced; and a third client suc-
cessfully evaded her lawyer's entreaties to agree to a medical exami-
nation to determine whether she was fit to hold a job.
Moving from procrastination to other strategies and tactics in
the negotiation of responsibility leads, as it were, from the core to
the periphery, from routine practice to more exceptional activities.
For instance, repression, or the failure to state goals or views of
which one is very much aware, is not at all unusual. 10 7 In addition,
103 See Griffiths, supra note 17, at 165.
104 Id. at 166 ("Lawyers' control over the legal procedure makes available various
techniques for cooling off conflict. Simple delay is often used to this end.").
105 See White, supra note 13, at 45.
106 Id. at 47.
107 For an argument about how lawyers should respond, see Luban, supra note 71, at
491.
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we encountered vacillation and indecision in three different sets of
circumstances: first, when both negotiations and adjudication ap-
peared seriously flawed; second, when either the lawyer or the client
viewed the other as unstable or unpredictable; and third, when one
or the other apparently lacked the ability to order and rank alterna-
tives. These occasions do not involve overt assertions of power;
rather, they are power drifts, instances where context or personality
disables lawyers and/or their clients from grasping the reins of
power.
In the abstract, the lawyers we studied espoused an ideology of
shared responsibility.10 8 They said that they try to divide the labor
with their clients such that, once they provide the client with the
capacity to understand the technical requirements and with the rele-
vant distillation of their professional experience, lawyer and client
together can set overall strategy and plan tactical moves. Some-
times behavior conforms to this ideology; most of the time it does
not. As one lawyer told us,
[The client] seems willing [to] . . . take my advice .... I would
say, ".... [W]e've got an agreement .... This is as good as you're
going to get in court, and I think it's not worth the risk of going to
court." And I think she would say, "OK, fine." On the other
hand, if I said, "Look, I think you can do better in court, and I
think it is worth the ordeal," which it will be, to go in there, and I
think "OK let's go in there and let the judge decide." She would
agree to that, too.
This is not joint consultation. These are the words of an "ex-
pert" who assumes his advice will be heeded. This language can be
interpreted as a reflection of power derived from professional struc-
ture, power that lawyers have because they are lawyers. It is, how-
ever, unclear what precise claim the lawyer is making-that the
client will do as he says because he is a lawyer, or that she will do as
he says because, being a lawyer, he has the knowledge and experi-
ence to warrant her reliance on him. In either case, the client is on
foreign terrain, terrain where the deployment of knowledge and ex-
perience may be resisted in various ways. That resistance compli-
cates and enriches the enactment of power in lawyer-client relations
even as it makes difficult, for both lawyer and client, to determine
who is responsible for what.
In the following section we examine enactments of power in the
negotiation of reality and responsibility within a single case. By at-
tending to a single case, we hope to demonstrate the forms that
power and resistance take in lawyer-client interaction, to show how
108 See Simon, supra note 62, at 486-89.
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clients re-make the advice they receive as they consume professional
services, and to illustrate changes over time in the enactments and
dynamics of power.
V
THE CASE OF THE "UNSUPPORTED WIFE"
The narrative that follows involves the divorce of Kathy, a client
whose case we followed, and Nick. Kathy has retained Wendy, a
solo practitioner, and Durr, Wendy's paralegal. When our observa-
tions began, Kathy had already conferred once each with Wendy
and Durr. We observed four conferences between Kathy and
Wendy and one between Kathy and Durr. In addition, we con-
ducted five interviews with Kathy and three with Wendy.' 0 9
Kathy is a housewife and part-time secretary living in California.
She had been married for 28 years when Nick, a local government
official, initiated divorce proceedings. They had four grown chil-
dren, one of whom was living at home. Kathy tried for many
months, without success, to bring about a reconciliation with
Nick."10 Beside the family house, where Kathy lived throughout the
divorce proceedings, the couple's assets consisted of their pensions,
modest collections of sculpture and rugs, two small savings ac-
counts, two vehicles, and assorted personal property.
Wendy began her legal career in 1963, a time when women law-
yers in her community were rare.I' Throughout her career she has
been primarily involved in family law, first working for the govern-
ment, then in a firm, and now alone. Although she says she has an
unusual understanding of the emotional dimensions of divorce, par-
ticularly with respect to women, she is nonetheless ambivalent about
this practice:
I kept getting these family law cases and I really kept fighting it
and I really didn't think I wanted to be a family lawyer because it is
really a miserable business. But one day I woke up and I thought,
"Well, I've been through it myself and I really know what these
people are going through and how they are hurting and some-
body had to do it."
Wendy believes she has a distinctive way of practicing family
law. Her theory is that, in addition to possessing all the expertise of
109 All conferences and interviews were audio-recorded. Nick and Durr attended
part of the first lawyer-client conference that we observed.
110 At the time we entered the case Kathy was clearly still trying to hold onto the
marriage. She was psychologically unwilling or unable to accept the idea of being re-
jected. For an insightful picture of the psychological dynamics of separation, see DIANE
VAUGHAN, UNCOUPLING (1972).
111 This was typical of the situation of the profession as a whole. See CYNTmA F.
EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAw 79-95 (1981).
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a certified family law specialist, she provides superior service be-
cause she can recognize and validate the emotional trauma typically
experienced by people in divorce. She is able to provide this service
because she had been divorced herself, because she is a woman and
thereby naturally empathizes with the situation of rejected women,
and because in Durr she has a superior support structure, available
at all hours, willing to listen to anything, and knowledgeable about
the intricacies of law enforcement and social service resources.
To illustrate the dynamics and trajectories of power in the ne-
gotiation of reality and responsibility between lawyers and clients,
we present this case chronologically, beginning with our first
observation.
FIRST LAWYER-CLIENT CONFERENCE. The first conference we
observed was unusual because of the presence of Nick, who had not
yet retained a lawyer. The stated reason for the conference was to
discuss the division of marital property. Wendy opens the meeting
by asking Nick what his thoughts are concerning the property divi-
sion: "Did you have a proposal for how you wanted to divide it or
did you want ... ?" Nick responds in a disarming way:
To me it's real simple. I mean, if she's going to ask for whatever,
I'm not contesting anything. I don't care about what happens
with that. I've given her the car, half the house, if it ever sells,
whatever part of my retirement or whatever part I own, she can
have it. I'm not trying to keep anything from her. To me it's sim-
ple. Just come up with whatever you feel is right and that's it.
This response is both passive-Nick says he is willing to do whatever
Wendy feels is fair-and, at the same time, hostile. He talks about
Kathy as if she were not present, and acts as if there really is nothing
to discuss; everything is already settled. He appears both in control
and ready to settle on whatever basis Wendy proposes.
Wendy all-too-readily accepts this posture and moves quickly to
discuss how to determine the worth of the assets. In so doing she
too largely ignores Kathy. She suggests that Nick obtain an evalua-
tion of the pensions. Later, she delegates to Kathy the tasks of de-
termining the value of their life insurance and of finding an
appraiser for the sculptures. These tasks are, in her words, "little
executory things." Kathy accepts her assignment without comment.
But signs of trouble quickly emerge as Wendy and Nick discuss
various items of personal property. While Nick acknowledges that
rugs exchanged in barter for his labor during the marriage are com-
munity property, he nevertheless feels that he has a privileged claim
to them because he had to hold two jobs to obtain them. Before
Nick leaves the conference, Wendy reminds him and Kathy of the
nature of the process that they are embarking on. "Most divorces
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nowadays," she says, "although there are a lot of emotions involved
with it, and you know, 'he said' and 'she did,' and things like that, it
really comes down to an accounting problem."
We see here the beginning of the negotiation of reality, of what
the legal process of divorce can do for the participants. The reality
that Wendy represents undervalues emotions, although she
presents herself as a lawyer who cares, a lawyer who understands the
emotional trauma of divorce. Even for a lawyer purportedly as emo-
tionally sensitive as Wendy, everything must be assigned a value or
else it is of no consequence.' 12 There is little explicit resistance-
neither Nick nor Kathy openly contest the version of legal reality
that Wendy presents. Yet as soon as Nick leaves, Wendy predicts
that Nick will "collapse" when he realizes the net difference between
his and Kathy's pensions, and "scream bloody murder and hit the
ceiling" when Kathy and Wendy make a comprehensive property
proposal to him. Her warning that the legal process is really about
accounting, not emotions, begins to have some bite.
Kathy responds by acknowledging that Nick has a temper prob-
lem. Yet the conference closes with Kathy defending Nick. She says
that Nick is really "a nice man," and she expresses her hope that the
divorce process will not "take that away from him." Wendy again
tries to introduce a note of reality based on her experience with the
legal process of divorce: "I hope we can do it with a minimum of
animosity. But there's bound to be a little resentment." The reality
of the divorce process is not just that it is an accounting problem,
but that the best that one can hope for is a "minimum of animosity"
and "a little resentment." While Kathy says she understands what
Wendy is saying, she nonetheless insists that the reality of the legal
divorce is not, and will not be, her reality. "I hate it," she says, "I
hate the whole thing" (the divorce and the divorce process).
Thus, almost before this case begins, reality and responsibility
are on the table. In the domain of responsibility, the lawyer tries to
get the client and her husband to do the drudge work, ostensibly to
save money. In the domain of reality, Nick's feelings about moon-
lighting, the reality of his hard work-i.e., that the first job is to sup-
port his family and the second is for himself-are at war with his
recognition that the law draws no such distinction. And Wendy
warns the pair that they can indulge their emotions as they wish, but
in the end emotions must give way to the "accounting problem."
Yet Wendy also recognizes that legal reality does not square
easily with the social reality that both Kathy and Nick experience.
112 For an extended discussion of this version of the reality of divorce, see Sarat &
Felstiner, supra note 12, at 93, 116-25.
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She knows that displacing emotions is not easy and predicts that
Nick's volatility will take over when he comes face to face with the
economic reality of divorce. 113 In making this prediction, Wendy
claims to know Kathy's social reality in a way that Kathy cannot
claim to know Wendy's legal and experiential reality. Thus lawyer
and client together paint the picture of a spouse whose first reac-
tions to new developments are likely to be extreme. The client's
contribution to this joint effort is based on first-hand experience
with her husband's temperament, the lawyer's more cynical and
pragmatic view is based on what she has seen in similar cases. To-
gether, they lay part of the mosaic of reality.
In her final comments about Nick and the divorce process,
Kathy resists and distances herself from the adversarial reality that
Wendy represents. Power slips away; Wendy will not be able to dic-
tate a single, uncomplicated reality. There is no easy acquiescence;
for Kathy the negotiation of the reality of her divorce has just be-
gun. Yet Kathy herself recognizes that she is now in an alien space
where the procedures and traditions that will govern her divorce are
not freely chosen. Whatever the possibilities for movement within
this space, the legal divorce is legal precisely because it is law's to
give. Entering the divorce process, she encounters rules that, while
self-evident and taken for granted by others, are not of her own
making. She must deal with professionals with well-established rou-
tines, no matter how foreign she finds these routines and no matter
how hard she resists. Her freedom of action, though considerable,
is constrained. Her resistance, however resourceful, will only be-
come meaningful as a reaction to the hierarchically structured legal
world.
FIRST INTERVIEW WITH CLIENT (4 days later). Kathy speaks eas-
ily to the interviewer about the breakdown of her marriage. She be-
lieves that counselling might have saved her marriage, but says that
Nick would not take part. She only found out that Nick had filed for
divorce when a friend noticed the announcement in the local news-
paper. Nevertheless she admits that she still "has a glimmer of hope
that maybe he will come to his senses."
Kathy consulted a lawyer (not Wendy) reluctantly:
Kathy: So I went to the lawyer and I waited and waited and waited
and I thought, "Boy, it's sure taking him a long time to do some-
thing about this." So I called him one day.
113 At another point in this conference we observe the first hint of how the lawyer
tries to keep the conversation focused on financial matters: when the client starts to talk
about her struggle to help her "kid through his drug problem," the lawyer successfully
changes the subject to the house and car payments. That part of the client's social world
relating to her child's problems is not to be part of the "reality" of this case.
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Interviewer: You mean this is waiting for your lawyer to do
something?
Kathy: Yeah, to do something. Like three months had passed and
I thought I surely should have heard something by now. Well, he
says: "Oh, I just found this sitting on my desk and the papers
were there."
Interviewer: You mean he had forgotten completely about the
whole thing?
Kathy: Yes.
Kathy chooses "exit"'1 14 and switches to Wendy, who has a rep-
utation as "a go-getter" and someone who will "really fight for her
clients." Moreover, Wendy makes available to her a person, Durr,
who seems to guarantee she will not be just another lost file.
This interview provides both a graphic illustration of a failure in
responsibility for case progress with the first lawyer, and intimations
of difficulties with the current lawyer in defining reality and as-
signing responsibility. Kathy tells the interviewer that she wants to
get her "fair share," which to her translates into the house, the op-
portunity to escape from her dead-end secretarial job, and some-
thing to even out their incomes. Yet she has not been asked to make
her goals clear to her lawyer. Given Wendy's previously demon-
strated tendency to extrapolate from her experiences with other
cases to the reality of Kathy's case, Wendy may assume she does not
need to ask in order to know what her client wants.
In any event, assuming rather than asking is an exercise of
power by indirection. Power here consists in what is not being said,
with the burden then shifted to the client, contrary to the picture of
lawyer-client relations in which lawyers are portrayed as agents of
their clients. But for the client, silence is its own kind of power and
protection. Not stating one's goals means that they cannot be la-
belled unreasonable and dismissed. 115
Another silence involves the division of labor between lawyer
and paralegal. Wendy has told Kathy that much of her case will be
processed by the paralegal, even though the paralegal's training and
functions have not been defined. Had Wendy explained the role of
the paralegal, Kathy might not have accepted that level of participa-
tion. The lawyer again exercises power by taking action without
consultation, rather than through an explicit decision.
FIRST INTERVIEW WITH LAWYER (6 weeks after the first confer-
ence). To Wendy, gender is the touchstone to tactics and strategy,
and explains her acute interest in power.
114 HIRSCHMANN, supra note 87, at 21.
115 On the power of silence as a strategy of power and resistance, see Scorr, supra
note 10, at 17-18.
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Interviewer: Do you see a difference in your role with women
clients?
Wendy: ... The women have a problem. All of a sudden their
career is threatened. They've been a housewife all these years
.... When the other attorney starts pushing a woman who's been
a housewife for 20 years .. . [to] go out and get a job, it really
angers me because they have to realize that if they were suddenly
told they could no longer practice law .. it would really be just
devastating .... I'm very protective of these women, especially
because I feel they are going to make a career change which is
going to affect them the rest of their lives, and as a result I want
them to take their time .... I mean I don't want them making any
rash decisions when they are under such an emotional strain. So I
will cover for my clients. I will drag. I will delay.
Wendy either seeks to exercise maternal power over, and on
behalf of, her clients, or likes to think of herself as doing so. She
seeks to protect them from aggressive lawyers who underestimate
what women go through during a divorce. In addition, by control-
ling the pace of the divorce, she serves interests that the client, in a
rush to closure, does not know she has.
Interviewer: What if a woman is married for 20 years, so she's in
her middle forties, [and her] kids are off in high school?
Wendy: The courts here feel she should become a useful, produc-
tive member of society. I don't agree with them. I think that a
woman who has been a career mother and wife all these years has
put in her time. If she had been in the army she'd be retired. But
they don't look at it from that standpoint.
At this point the lawyer's view of what is desirable departs from
the reality of law itself. Wendy presents herself as powerful because
she knows both the reality of the everyday world of law and the real-
ity of the everyday lives of women.
Interviewer: What kind of expectations do these women come to
you with?
Wendy: Well, I think most of them see in the movies or read the
books where the husband is going to pay for the divorce, and they
are going to get alimony and they are going to get the house.
Wendy thinks of her clients as living in a world of fiction, as
resisting the harsh realities of husbands who refuse to pay alimony
and houses that get sold as just another piece of community prop-
erty.' 16 She has struck at the core of the procrastination dilemma.
Clients may not be emotionally ready to face legal and economic
realities. The supportive lawyer ought then be prepared to "cover,
116 For a discussion of the impact of divorce on the economic status of women, see
WErrZMAN, supra note 60, at 323-56.
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drag and delay." But for how long? And who is to decide how long
is long enough?
At the same time as they expose the ambiguous nature of delay,
Wendy's actions show the indirect and elusive nature of some enact-
ments of power. Interrogatories had been served on this lawyer and
yet she has not looked at them. Have they been ignored as part of a
conscious strategy of delay, or have they been shunted aside be-
cause of other, more pressing work? It is, moreover, unlikely that
Wendy has told Kathy about the interrogatories. Is this a laywer's
self-protective move, or a deliberate decision to let the client heal
emotionally before she is dragged back into the minutiae of the
case? Has the lawyer focused on the situation of this client, who has
by this time been separated from her husband for nearly three years,
or does she assume that all similarly situated middle-age women
should be treated alike? Is this an instance of benevolent maternal-
ism or simple neglect, of an enactment of power or the power of
inattention?
SECOND INTERVIEW WITH CLIENT (11 weeks after the first confer-
ence). Kathy begins by saying, "I don't know what's going on. Not
a heck of a lot is going on. We're just getting paperwork done."
Although the required attention to financial detail was "a pain in the
neck ... you sure know where you stand when you are finished."
When asked about her attitude toward the pace of the case, Kathy
said:
I think I'm reaching a point now where I either want to get it over
with or something else better happen .... Ijust can't stand this
any more .... Ijust feel like I'm floating around in space .... I
don't care if I clean my house .... I don't care about anything.
I'm not normally like this.
Despite her sense of urgency, Kathy had not said anything to
either Wendy or Durr about "the pace at which things get done." 117
She believes that Nick is also anxious to get the case going, espe-
cially because his living conditions are "terrible." Yet at the same
time that Kathy wants the marriage to be over, she continues to be
upset by its breakup.
I have a feeling that if we could have had counselling together that
this is a marriage that could have been saved because it was a
good marriage, it was a strong marriage, and I just feel like God,
why are you doing this. But it is a need in Nick. I can really see
that .... But I haven't changed the way I feel. I really miss him
very much .... It's [the feelings about rejection] the worst thing
I've ever dealt with in my life.
117 It is as if we were being given access to the kind of "hidden transcript" that Scott
argues is constructed to resist dominant power. See Sco-rr, supra note 10, at 4-5.
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At this point, the social world of the client and the legal world
of the lawyer appear to overlap, at least in terms of determining the
client's financial needs. But in the more important matter of the
client's emotional posture and whether or not to prosecute the case,
there does not appear to be any connection between lawyer and cli-
ent. It is not that the lawyer has prevailed in a contest over timing
and progress and is now simply "in charge." Instead, the question
of timing and progress is an unexplored, unaddressed irritant-a
weakness, not a strength, for a lawyer who imagines herself as
mother-protector.
Kathy wants to go in two directions at once. The status quo is
intolerable. She wants her husband back and she desperately awaits
the miracle that will return him to her life. But she fears this will not
happen and is consequently resigned to getting on with the case.
The problem in constructing a joint reality between lawyer and cli-
ent is that, while the client tells this all to the interviewer, she fails to
tell the lawyer. As a result, the case hardly moves at all.
THIRD INTERVIEW WITH CLIENT (23 weeks after the first confer-
ence). In a short interview, Kathy several times expresses her belief
that substantial progress should have been made in her case, and
disappointment that it had not:
I expected a lot to happen before I went on vacation, and I
thought, "Nothing is happening," so I paid my bill and I went on
my vacation and came back and still nothing has happened .... I
expect it to be final pretty soon or something.., but there's been
nothing from a lawyer .... I really have not talked to those peo-
ple for a good, I don't know, five months maybe.
Although she still seems bothered that progress in the case
would carry her further away from marriage, she is increasingly rec-
onciled to the fact that there is no alternative:
I don't really want [things to get going], I mean I have mixed feel-
ings about the whole thing, but when I talk to my kids, they say,
"Mom, just don't hold out any false hopes, so why don't you just
get it over with." And I think, "Ok, they are right. It's time to
stop this stuff."
This interview shows that the silence over case progress per-
sists. The client's views are clear to us, if not to the lawyer. She
wants to get on with the case unless her husband is coming back,
which she understands is not really going to happen. But the lawyer
is doing nothing to push the case along.
For Kathy the experience is mysterious; she does not confront
the reality of a lawyer who is not paying attention to her case. In-
stead, in the face of her own inability, or unwillingness, to do more
than pay her bill and hope that something will happen, of her inabil-
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ity and unwillingness to enact the power of the principal to com-
mand her agent, there is the ambiguity of inaction.
Is Kathy's case again lost in her lawyer's office, out of sight and
off the agenda? Or is Wendy acting on a theory that the best indica-
tor of this type of client's readiness to proceed is when she affirma-
tively asks the lawyer to get on with it? Both alternatives would be
passive enactments of power by the lawyer: the difference between
them is that the first is about responsibility (the lawyer is not doing
what the client wants because it does not suit her), the latter about
reality (the lawyer knows the state a client must be in before pro-
gress is feasible and knows how to identify it).
FOURTH INTERVIEW WITH CLIENT (25 weeks after the first confer-
ence). This interview occurred in a brief interlude before the sec-
ond lawyer-client conference. Kathy reports that she and Nick
"were never going to be able to talk to each other again if some-
thing did not happen pretty fast," so she made an appointment with
Wendy. She says that she hated the process of haggling over small
amounts of money or items of property: "it's just so picky." At this
point, the harmony of the earlier conversation between Wendy,
Nick, and Kathy has disappeared. As Kathy feared, the divorce pro-
cess is bringing out the worst in Nick. The legal reality is fast con-
taminating her social world. Despite the fact that she is paying the
bill, she feels powerless to make things happen.
While the social world has finally signalled Kathy that she must
take responsibility for getting the process going, in another domain
the world of divorce has yet to make an imprint. While most people
are generally quite concerned with style, since it is one of the com-
mon ways to draw social boundaries, Kathy has what might be called
an unusually severe case of bourgeois manners. Arguing over small
amounts of money is distasteful. But divorce, in its entirety, is in bad
taste and the full range of its unattractiveness is not yet clear to
Kathy. Although the lawyer appears to think that she comprehends
the social world of the client, she has not fully initiated the client
into the reality of the legal world.
SECOND LAWYER-CLIENT CONFERENCE (25 weeks after the first
conference).
Wendy: Okay, from what I understand, Kathy, you want to get
going on this again.
Kathy: I do. Nick is getting to the point where he would hardly
talk to me and I don't want that to happen. I still would like to
remain friends if we can.
Wendy's opening comment shifts the blame for the lack of pro-
gress in the case from lawyer to client. Yet Kathy chooses not to
hear or feel the blame. Her "I do" resonates with what she hopes to
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preserve from the marriage by moving forward to end it.118 Her
wishes are finally made clear; what had been until now unspoken is
finally put into words.
Yet the conference does not actually focus on how to get the
case moving. Instead, attention shifts to financial detail. Discussion
turns to the net value of the house, the value of other significant
items, and the relationship of spousal support to property division.
Kathy's fleeting assertion of power is quickly lost in "accounting."
Wendy: I can't see that we can come up with enough to offset
your equity in the house unless he's willing to take a note or
something to that effect. Have you discussed this with him at all?
Kathy: . . . At one time he said that he might be willing to go
along, but this was about two months ago.
Wendy: I think you have to give him a note for $24,000.
Kathy: That's a tremendous amount.
Wendy: Maybe we can get him to keep on making the house
payments?
Kathy: I doubt it very much. I think he's really sick of it.
Wendy: You've had a long marriage and you should be entitled to
some support because he does make a lot more money than you
do .... So that's something we have to consider.
[You could sell the house and get a condominium or] buy a mo-
bile home.
Kathy: I would prefer to keep my house if I could.
Wendy: The only way we can get this part resolved is by getting
that little loose end tied [the value of some sculptures]. We have
all the figures on everything else .... I can write her [Nick's
lawyer] a comprehensive letter saying I think we should do it this
way. I don't think your husband is going to agree to it, but I think
at least ... we will get things moving again.
There is one important diversion in this conversation:
Kathy: [The youngest child is] my cross to bear.
Wendy: The baby, huh? Doesn't want to leave. They must call
that nesting now.
Kathy: Yes. I'm afraid that's what it is.
Wendy: And he's all settled in.
Kathy: Well, he's going to have to unsettle himself because I've
told him ....
118 "I do" is also an eerie reminder of the marriage vow; "Do you take ... ?" "I
do."
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Wendy: Now, what about the sculptures? We still haven't
touched on those. We have the furniture divided, right?
The conference has begun on a by now familiar and ambiguous
note. The plain meaning of Wendy's introductory remarks is that
the client is responsible for the hiatus in case progress and has now
decided to get things going again. Since we know that is not the
case, Wendy is either smoothly shifting blame for the dead time to
Kathy or trying to get a fix on her client's emotional readiness to get
on with the case. But the language used is rather roundabout for a
lawyer interested in the client's emotional condition.
Wendy quickly gets to what is for her the heart of the case.
How can Kathy keep her house? Wendy is not optimistic about the
house, and is rather cavalier in suggesting a move to a mobile home.
Given Kathy's age, low income, and skill level, the question of
spousal support would seem to be as important as the house, yet it is
only raised as an item for future negotiation. Wendy is not ready to
confront this aspect of reality and Kathy rather passively follows her
lawyer's lead.
Wendy interrupts Kathy's attempt to explain how she is going
to kick her youngest child out of the house with a question about the
sculptures. This interchange repeats a sequence in the first confer-
ence and reflects Wendy's unwillingness to give her client's non-
financial personal problems a place on the agenda. Although those
problems have no legal standing, they are not explicitly ruled out of
order; rather, they are shunted aside by a change in subject.
THIRD LAWYER-CLIENT CONFERENCE (31 weeks after the first
conference). This conference is the defining moment in negotia-
tions over both reality and responsibility. The agenda proves to be
focused on three questions: who is going to conduct the negotia-
tions; what are the lawyer's and client's goals concerning the house
and support; and, if the goals are not clear, how they are to be de-
termined. Kathy begins with a report of her discussions with Nick
about the house. She had presented him with four scenarios:
I - Sell the house.
2 - Sell the house in two years when they would be eligible for
favorable tax treatment.
3 - Buy him out.
4 - Trade the house for two condos.
After a discussion of all the asset values, Wendy tells Kathy that
it would take about $20,000 to buy out Nick's share:
Wendy: So what we tell them, I don't know whether you want to
tell him, because you seem to be negotiating fine, or I can call his
attorney and say, "Well look, we have certain costs of sale and
everything when you do sell the house. Because you will be sell-
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ing it eventually. Therefore we figure the net equity is so much,
and in adding the items that you should get versus what I should
get and everything, I figure that $20,000 is approximately"-I'll
be glad to make a copy of this for you, in fact, so that you can take
it along and show him if you wish.
Kathy: Yes.
Kathy: And this way you [imagining what she will say to Nick]
don't have to pay any support.
Wendy: All right. Well, whatever, however you want to do that.
But shouldn't you be getting support from him? Are you getting
support from him?
Kathy: He's paying the house payment.
Wendy: Well, I think even after you get divorced you are going to
need some continued help from him. If he's making the house
payment now and you are going to have a $20,000 second to pay
on it, to him, how are you going to do that?... You know a little
practicality around here won't hurt. You've had a long marriage
and therefore you are entitled to support and obviously you can't
make enough on your own to support yourself and become self-
supporting. Now you can rent out rooms, take in laundry and
things like that, but let's look at it from a practical standpoint.
Kathy: No, I threw my iron away.
Wendy: You know, as I have told you, whatever you take out of
this marriage has got to last you the rest of your life. Prince
Charming just has not been known to come along and sweep up
my clients .... It is a practical matter that we have to figure out.
Wendy: This is really your best opportunity to keep this one
[house] if you can. As you said, you are probably going to have to
rent out a room or take a second job, if you want to do that, or
turn to robbing banks .... Your husband is just going to have to
get used to the fact that you are his forever insofar as responsibil-
ity for support is concerned. I mean, he may get rid of the body,
but he ain't going to get rid of the responsibility. You are going
to have to get support from him. You just don't make enough
money.
Kathy: He's not going to want to hear that.
Wendy: Well, he's not going to want to hear it because people
don't hear what they don't want to hear .... But it doesn't work
that way. He is stuck with you.
The question of who will do the negotiating surfaces early in
this conference. It is rather clear that this lawyer, unlike most, does
not want to do it. She compliments Kathy on her performance to
date, even though that performance has produced no concrete re-
sults. Then she says she could talk to the other lawyer, but in the
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middle of the imaginary conversation that she would have with the
lawyer she switches to the voice of her client--"in adding the items
that you should get versus what I should get"-indicating, at least
indirectly, that she is not really going to have'any such discussion
with the other lawyer.
The focus then shifts from the house to support. Kathy does
not think that her husband will agree to pay support. Still, Wendy
does not accept that picture of the future. Regardless of the disposi-
tion of the house, Kathy cannot support herself and should not de-
lude herself that someone ("Prince Charming") is going to come to
her rescue. Reality is again juxtaposed to fantasy, the world of the
legally possible to the world of dreams and fairy-tales.
Wendy asserts that their job is to convince Nick that he cannot
evade his responsibility simply through denial. Despite the force of
both the argument and the language in which it is expressed, this
enactment of power misses its mark, is evaded, and left unad-
dressed. Kathy does not contradict Wendy on the issue of need, but
she never agrees that support is a fixed objective.
In a sense, two static versions of reality are at war with one an-
other. Both Wendy and Kathy agree that Kathy needs support.
Kathy does not think that Nick will agree to provide it, but she does
not express this view forcefully enough to make her lawyer explain
how to go about getting it. Again, no one seems in charge. This
case, like most of the cases we observed, does not move in a linear
fashion. Important questions are raised, discussed, but then left
hanging; positions are advocated to an audience which seems all-
too-able to tune them out.
This condition is most clearly reflected in the discussion con-
cerning the disposition of the house. The conference began with
Kathy talking about four different schemes that the client and her
husband had discussed. In response, Wendy presents a series of al-
ternatives, some of them intelligible, some of them not.
[1] The nice thing would be if you could buy him out and then,
eventually, if you sell it you'll have the rollover by yourself.
[2] Another alternative would be taking spousal support of
whatever your house payment is, $400 something a month, and
saying, okay I'll give you a note for $20,000 and what you do is
Uust give it back to him].
[3] Now you might also work out some kind of agreement with
him that you will owe him $20,000 from the house that you will
pay him when you sell the house or die, whichever comes first.
[4] Do we divide it up then [the time of sale] and figure out your
[husband's] equity based on what is the actual price of the house
or do you take your chances with me and hope it goes up in value,
or if it goes down in value, you get less money?
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[5] What we can do is put something to the effect that you'll keep
the house, the house will be sold no later than or listed for sale no
later than such-and-such a date, that upon the close of the house,
that within 60 days thereafter, either one of you may put on a cap
under the issue of support for the court to determine what your
needs are at that time.
[6] [You could waive support in exchange for his interest in the
house]. I really think that you would be giving up far more than
you would be getting in a case like that because you are talking
about $400 a month is $4800 a year and in four years he would
have paid you $20,000. If in that four year period of time you were
to get injured and could not work, you may need to have the sup-
port continued. If you waive it for now and forever more, then if
you get sick in two years, you may end up having to sell the house
and live off that and go on welfare eventually because you have no
recourse to have him help you. So it's one of those things you
have to decide.
[7] Another possibility is the two of you refinance the house and
he gets his $20,000 out that way, and then you have a bigger
house payment and guess who is going to help with that too?
[8] Of course, we talked about the possibility of using the renter
to pay off the $20,000.
[9] Also you could arrange with your husband for interest only,
payable at the end of five years or something and negotiable, re-
negotiable at that time.
[10] Maybe he'd also work out something where he'll only have to
pay half the support and he'll waive, he'll give you the house. I
mean, that's another thing to look at. Say "Look, I'll agree to take
only $200 a month support in exchange and even make it
nonmodifiable or something."
These alternatives were neither generated logically from some
set of empirical and normative assumptions nor presented all at
once; rather, they seemed to be the product of Wendy's stream of
consciousness engagement with the problems of the house and sup-
port. That Kathy, even if she took notes, could keep much of it
straight as she set off to deal with her husband, is doubtful. In mid-
stream she confessed that the conference "gives me ideas, but I get
totally confused when I thought I really knew what I was doing. I
mean I really thought I had that thing [the house question] wired."
Despite the rather haphazard presentation of alternatives, we
see in the following exchanges that Wendy does have a negotiation
strategy in mind, however unusual it appears to be:
Wendy: You may need to talk to him some more before you come
up with a conclusion or something and see if he's interested in any
of these.
Kathy: That sounds like quite a few alternatives.
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Wendy: Quite a shopping list right there that you can go over
with him and kick around. Maybe one of these will be acceptable.
Kathy: Yeah, maybe.
Wendy: And if it is then we can work things out.
Wendy: Well, anyway, do some talking and see what you come up
with and if you want me to step in and talk to the attorney I think
Kathy: I may have to.
Wendy: I'd be glad to.
Kathy: Because, as I say, I'm not that knowledgeable and I just
hope that I can [interrupted].
While there is considerable confusion and circularity, there is
also some forward movement. But it is still not a directed move-
ment and neither Wendy nor Kathy seems to have the case in hand.
Power drifts. Wendy extends a half-hearted offer of help, yet Kathy
is re-assigned the responsibility to negotiate even as she admits that
she is not sure what she is doing. Wendy and Kathy seem to agree
that without spousal support Kathy has no income security. But
Kathy still does not believe that her husband will agree to provide
support. Despite Wendy's pressing concerns about the risks of life
without at least the possibility of support, she gives Kathy carte
blanche to relinquish such a claim, a remarkable position for a law-
yer who, as we will see, believes her professional role is to stiffen the
"backbone and spine" of her women clients. This negotiation about
the reality of goals is, from Wendy's perspective, a negative enact-
ment of power: the major theme seems to be that it is the client's
life, hers to mess up if she pleases.
Wendy provides virtually no professional contribution, no ex-
plicit direction, despite her decades of family law practice. All she
can do is list alternatives, as if to say, "Here is a set of outcomes that
are technically feasible; see if your husband will buy any of them."
Perhaps this is a subtle way to ascertain Nick's opening position, but
it sounds more like an invitation to consider anything that he finds
acceptable.
Wendy sends Kathy out to negotiate with Nick without any ad-
vice about psychology, structure, stakes, moves, tactics, or order of
alternatives, and without any background about what a judge would
be likely to do if a settlement is not achieved. Moreover, Wendy
offers no justification for her abdication. Why, the client might won-
der, does my lawyer exclude herself from negotiations with the
other side?
This phase of the case is difficult to interpret. Have we encoun-
tered a lawyer who speaks the language of a politically correct pro-
fessional woman, but whose behavior is in fact disorganized and
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ineffective? Or is she, to the contrary, deftly sending Kathy out to
negotiate with Nick, knowing that little will be accomplished, but
believing that only these frustrating encounters with him will lead
her to redefine their relationship in realistic terms, which then will
form the basis for sound negotiations?
There is no point in searching for some positivist reality that
drives out alternative meanings. This text is simply our reproduc-
tion of their production. But the truth of what is going on in
Wendy's mind, if there is any one authentic version, does not make
any difference to our larger point about the nature of power in pro-
fessional relationships. Whether Wendy is a very poor, or a very
crafty, lawyer does not affect the proposition that lawyers and clients
are not fully conversant with each others' agendas, that their inter-
actions are in the form of negotiations, and that direction and influ-
ence flow back and forth between them, and even away from them
both.
FOURTH LAWYER-CLIENT CONFERENCE (37 weeks after the first
conference). This conference may be viewed as something of a cor-
rective to the proceding one. Wendy takes a strong position about
goals, reinforces her view by describing a court's likely attitude, and
establishes a practical plan for conducting the next stage of negotia-
tions. However, because of Wendy's lack of preparation, the confer-
ence gets off to a bad start:
Wendy: Okay. Let's see. Where's your file, do I have it here?
What are we here for?
Kathy: I wish I knew what I was here for.
Wendy: ... You were going to go back and talk to your husband,
I believe.
Kathy: Yes, I did .... Hejust said anything I wanted to do, do it.
Wendy: ... What can we do. There are several alternatives ...
I'm trying to remember because this was November 3rd, so it's
been six weeks.
Kathy: You mean you can't remember that long?
Wendy: I don't understand.
Kathy: Gee, I can.
The image in this initial dialogue is not of a lawyer who has
taken charge, but rather of one still unable to grasp the reality of the
client's pressing needs. Those needs are indicated when Kathy says
she wishes she knew what she was "here for." Wendy hears that
comment as if Kathy had forgotten something, rather than under-
standing it as a general statement of Kathy's continuing doubts and
disorientation. Moreover, Wendy quickly becomes the disoriented
one, unable to grasp why the client would care that she remember
the earlier meeting.
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The conference moves on to review the conversations that
Kathy has been having with Nick:
Wendy: And so you haven't told him the sad facts of life that you
are going to have to continue to have money?
Kathy: I have not told him anything like that. I figured the less I
said the better.
Wendy: [Whether you sell the house or not] you'll probably be
entitled to some support .... What do you want to do?
Kathy: I don't know what the best thing to do is. I honestly don't,
just listening to you. That's where I'm at a total loss. I do not
know what the best thing to do is.
For the first time in their interaction, Wendy asks Kathy directly
what she wants to do. Power is shifted; the client is invited to as-
sume the directive role. But Kathy does not take up the invitation
and substitutes the question of what is "best" for the question of
what she wants. Any reality that she may want to construct seems to
demand knowledge that she does not possess.
In Kathy, Wendy confronts a client unable to articulate goals
despite the negotiations she has been conducting with her husband
for months. Wendy responds by upping the ante:
Wendy: Well, it's really your decision because you have to live
with it for the rest of your life.
Kathy: I know.
Wendy: If I make that decision and later on you are unhappy
about it you are going to say, "Well, why did she choose this road
to go." I think probably, unless you let him know he's going to
have to pay support, you may be working on a false assumption.
He's going to have to know that whether you keep the house or
sell the house or whatever, he's going to have to pay you support.
Kathy: . . . I really wish that I didn't have to take anything.
Wendy: I understand that. But let's be practical.... You have all
these basic expenses that there is nothing you can do about. You
cannot meet them. You cannot make enough money to do so.
Kathy: You know I'm just a wimp.
Wendy: If you were a brain surgeon I'd tell you to tell him to go
buzz off and waive it. But you can't do that. You don't make
enough money, and I'm really concerned about how are we going
to take care of you. You have to have income from him too.
There is just no other way that you are going to get around it.
Once past the formulaic lines about whose decision counts,
Wendy goes beyond the "we could do this or we could do that"
stance that she took in the previous conference, insisting that the
client demand the necessary spousal support. The world of the cli-
ent's wishes is now vividly contrasted with that of practicality.
Wendy insists that the client face a reality that, from her lawyer's
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experience in divorce, she knows best. As the lawyer becomes more
strident, the client's seems to lose all decisiveness-she has no idea
what to do, and refers to herself as a "wimp." This apparent indeci-
sion may reflect resignation rather than weakness, a paralysis in-
duced by knowledge that she will not get that which she requires. In
Wendy's insistence that there are no alternatives, what might look
like a power grab seems more like the hard sell.119
The negotiation of goals and the allocation of responsibility be-
tween Wendy and Kathy take on new dimensions when recent finan-
cial experience is reviewed:
Wendy: So what he's paying you is certainly a fair amount ...
based on his income. But I still think you need more on top of
that. Didn't I tell you you needed a couple of hundred dollars
more than he's giving you already .... Is he paying the taxes and
insurance or are you paying them?
Kathy: No, I'm paying it.
Wendy: So he's paying about $400 a month.
Kathy: Uh-huh.
Wendy: Oh, he's not. That's ridiculous. Here we go again. He
should be paying more now.
Kathy: ... I know I've gone through the savings account almost.
Wendy: ... Why have you let him get away with this all this time?
Conscious or not, Wendy is engaging in classic scapegoating:
"why have you let him get away with this all this time?" Unappeal-
ing as this behavior may be, it is a forceful attempt to shake the
client out of her reluctance to ask for support. Thus, in negotiating
the reality of the client's post-divorce financial situation, Wendy
now appears ready to employ whatever tools it takes to get her
message across.
In the following exchange we see the reality that lawyer and
client are trying to negotiate. That reality again involves ajuxtaposi-
tion of Wendy's self-proclaimed practicality with Kathy's increasing
willingness to play the role that Wendy is assigning to her.
Wendy: What do you do if the roof falls down? You have to have
a new roof put on.
Kathy: I don't know.
Wendy: Well, you have to think about this. It's a very practical
situation.
Kathy: I'm not, see, I've never really given much thought to me.
Wendy: Well, I understand that and we've already talked about
being number five and now you are number one. You really have
to start thinking about what's going to, what's best for Kathy.
What are you going to do. And I'm really awfully concerned.
119 On the dilemmas of such a position, see Simon, supra note 64, at 217.
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Kathy: Well, I will, I'll tell him. I can hear it now.
Matters of real significance are contained in this brief exchange.
Kathy appeals to Wendy to take care of her by suggesting that she
has never been able to take care of herself. Wendy seems to ac-
knowledge that Kathy's difficulties spring from her view of herself
and the world, as well as from simple naivete about the hard realities
of living by herself. Kathy needs help to look out for herself, and if
she cannot muster the courage to confront her husband about his
responsibilities, her financial future will be bleak. The client initially
resists: she cannot think about the confrontation without cringing.
Yet, in the end, she imagines herself doing what Wendy has asked
her to do, while fearing Nick's expected outrage.
A concrete proposal and a plan for negotiations is then worked
out for the first time.
Wendy: What we will give him, no interest, $22,000 payable in
five years out of the sale of the house, and it would be secured by
a second trust deed on the house. But at least if we make this kind
of offer, now, if you like I can instead write a letter to his attorney
making this offer. Generally, this is the way people do it, involv-
ing the attorney. But I know the two of you have been trying to
keep the costs down and have been able to negotiate. So if the
two of you can do it, that's just fine.
Kathy: Well, I will go back to him and tell him exactly as it's here.
Wendy: This way you've at least made an offer, so you've gotten
things moving a bit; I mean this thing is really kind of mired down
and it's silly for us every six weeks to get together and go over the
same figures again and the same conversation.
Kathy: I know. And I'm such a dunce when it comes to anything
like this, I just .... I can remember that.
Wendy: Okay, give him a $20,000 note payable in five years, se-
cured, and that you need support of a minimum of $500 a month.
It should be more than that. Tell him that I said that's rock bot-
tom.., and I'm appalled that you haven't been getting more.
This climactic exchange is both clarifying and confusing. It is
clarifying in that the lawyer and client have been able to negotiate a
proposal and have agreed on a definite plan for its delivery. They
have settled on reality and responsibility simultaneously. However,
the exchange is confusing because they discuss two very different
versions of the proposal. The first version includes a $22,000 trans-
fer, to be made from the proceeds of a sale; there is no mention of
support. The second version involves a $20,000 transfer, no sale,
and includes support. Kathy says that she can remember "that," but
which "that" is she to remember?
The exchange also suggests that Wendy's supposed interest in
minimizing Kathy's legal fees, manifested in the assignment of ne-
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gotiations to Kathy, is based on a lack of commitment to the case, a
certain laziness about really getting involved. Wendy is well aware
of both the inefficiency of Kathy's past efforts at negotiations and of
the repetitive and circular nature of their exchanges. She acknowl-
edges that it would be routine at this point to send the demand in
writing to the other lawyer. But rather than make that effort, she
makes only a half-hearted offer to take over the negotiations.
Is Kathy just a helpless victim of a lazy lawyer or, even now, are
circularity and repetition her way of exercising power? At some
level is she aware that, as long as she keeps the divorce process from
reaching closure the possibility of reconciliation with Nick remains?
Who is "using" whom and for what purpose? Is Kathy a passive
consumer, or an agent whose apparent passivity produces an in-
tended circularity and repetitiveness that Wendy now recognizes?
At the end of the conference, it is apparent that Kathy is still
unconvinced that there will be any spousal support in her future.
Wendy: Once he finds out that you have to get spousal support,
he may say "You'll rot in hell before I'll give you a nickel," which
you can tell him, "Well heck, my attorney's heard that one before,
umpteen hundred times." But that's not true. You will get
money from him. There's just no question.
Kathy: I'm sure of that. I mean, I'm sure he's not sure of it.
Wendy: Right. But I'm just telling you if we go to court, you are
getting money from him. You will probably get more. He's been
getting away with murder and we've been letting him do it, but no
more Ms. Nice Guy .... Too many people have lived to regret
the fact that they wanted to get along with their ex-husband. If
getting along with him means you live at the poverty level and he
lives on Easy Street, how long are you going to get along with him
before you start resenting it?
Kathy: Not very long, I'm afraid. I'm afraid that's very true.
In this exchange, Wendy mobilizes the conventional authori-
ties, "what the court will do" and "what other clients have exper-
ienced," in an effort to persuade Kathy to accept the legal view of
reality. She should receive support because a court would grant
support;120 she will regret the day she bargains for privation, as have
other women. The client leaves and will talk to her husband-but
what will she say? Neither lawyer nor client really know.
SECOND INTERVIEW WITH LAWYER (immediately following the
previous conference). The interview focuses on Wendy's view of
Kathy as a negotiator and the court's probable attitude toward
support:
120 This claim is a vivid example of the "bargaining in the shadow of the law" that
takes place between lawyer and client. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 66.
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Interviewer: Did you expect her, the last time that she talked [to
the husband] to say the things that she's now going back to talk to
him about?
Wendy: Yeah, I really thought that, well that was November 3rd, I
really figured at that point she would take it to him and we would
have it wrapped up .... It's not really a terribly satisfactory thing
having her negotiate it like this ... because she is not getting her
fair share. And if she had said, "OK, you can handle it," she'd be
getting quite a bit more than she's going to be settling for .... If
I had it my way, we'd have been in court six months ago with an
order to show cause to get a little more spousal support.
Interviewer: Do you think it's possible that she thinks if she sort
of lives with this situation and behaves in a nice fashion, that he'll
give up the idea of the divorce?
Wendy: No. But I think a lot of women delude themselves into-
feeling that if they are nice and fair that if they run into financial
trouble, their ex-husbands will help them financially. And I try to
get across to them that that is not going to happen.
In this conversation, Wendy initially portrays herself as the
powerless victim of a client who will not let her act: if Wendy were
able to act, Kathy would receive more spousal support. But Wendy
still refuses to recognize that what Kathy wants from Nick is emo-
tional rather than financial support. Thus, Wendy quickly dismisses
the suggestion that Kathy may actually know what she is doing, that
she has a clear purpose in mind. The reality on which Wendy fo-
cuses is not the reality of the continuing emotional tie between
Kathy and Nick. Instead, Wendy is now in full "accounting" mode.
Interviewer: What do you think a judge's attitude would be about
spousal support?
Wendy: There's no question. She's been married to him for a
long, long time. He's making much more money than she is ....
She's established her ability to earn an income and established a
need. So there's no question a judge would order her support.
And she would easily get $500 a month.
The reality against which Wendy evaluates the posture of the
case is shaped by her view of what the court would do. This reality
places her in the unpleasant position of having to admit that their
negotiating strategy is not working. As Wendy puts it, "I just don't
think I'm going to get her enough money. But is there ever
enough?" Yet Wendy seems helpless to change the strategy.
FIFTH INTERVIEW WITH CLIENT (43 weeks after the first confer-
ence). Kathy had come to the office to see Durr, but also spoke to
the interviewer about Nick's response to the support proposal and
her reaction to that.
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Kathy: Wendy wanted me to go back and tell him [Nick] that I
wanted to stay there two years or something and that I needed x
dollars a month.
Interviewer: Did he have a specific reaction to that?
Kathy: Do you really want to know what he said?
Interviewer: Yeah, what did he say?
Kathy: He said, "Christ, I'm not going to do that." And I said,
"Well, I'm just telling you what the lawyer said."
Kathy's response is as telling as her husband's. She did not ar-
gue for support on the merits. She puts all responsibility for the
demand on her lawyer. She is not asking for this arrangement that
infuriates her husband; she is simply a messenger relaying informa-
tion from a professional. The reality that her lawyer thought she
had finally negotiated with Kathy was, in Kathy's presentation to
Nick, only an expedient, a way to end an unpleasant conversation.
That Kathy's social world was highly conflicted was made clear
by this interview and by the conversation with the paralegal.
Interviewer: Do you think he is trying to push you to the wall?
Kathy: Well, I don't. I told him one time, I said I'm really scared.
I am scared because I've been a wife and mother for a heck of a
long time and all of a sudden I'm thrust out there. And he's al-
ways made fun of my stupid littlejobs, as he called it. Now, all of
a sudden, my stupid little jobs have got to be my livelihood.
Interviewer: Right.
Kathy: And I'm scared. I'm really scared.
Interviewer: And is he sympathetic, do you think, to that?
Kathy: Oh, I think so. He says, why should you be. You are intelli-
gent. But intelligence has nothing to do with it.
This picture is one side of her reality -a vulnerable, untrained
worker in a tough job market, with no prospects for improvement
and no second line of defense. But despite her worry about the fu-
ture, Kathy's definitive position seems to be: "You know, I'm not
going to ask for the money. I really am not."
Throughout the case Wendy has been inconsistent, inattentive,
and too late in her efforts at the joint construction of the social and
legal world that make up the reality of her client's future. In the
defining enactment of power, Wendy gave Kathy more responsibil-
ity than Kathy could carry, and she did this despite her misgivings
about Kathy's ability to realistically imagine the future and confront
its difficulties. 2 1
121 At this point in the case the client asked that we stop observing conferences and
not interview her further. She did not give a reason for withdrawing from the study.
Her withdrawal paralleled the way clients react to the accummulation of unstated dissat-
isfaction with lawyers. See infra text accompanying note 87. The exit without explana-
tion marked the limits of her tolerance for the social science strategy in which everything
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THE DENOUEMENT. The marriage was eventually dissolved and
a settlement agreement incorporated into the judgment one year
and seven months after the first conference. Kathy kept the house.
Her share of community property was stated to be worth $27,000
more than Nick's. In consideration of Nick's foregoing any claim
based on this unequal distribution, Kathy irrevocably waived any
claim to spousal support.
THIRD INTERVIEW WITH LAWYER (14 months after judgment was
entered). This interview was, for the most part, devoted to securing
background information about Wendy's education, career, and her
goals in divorce practice. The latter have a distinctly therapeutic, if
not political, cast, yet they were hardly apparent in Kathy's case:
Wendy: Nobody wins. It's not a question of winning in this. It's
how much can you take out with your sanity and dignity intact. I
try to encourage them that living well is the best revenge and that
they can't look back over their shoulders and worry about what
he's doing with whom. They have to go on. And I guess the ma-
jor satisfaction we've gotten out of it is to see some of these wo-
men come in who are just, I mean you have to scoop them up in a
basket, they are just so awful. I mean, the women who come in
here say: "Give him everything. He's going to kill me if I don't."
Or the husband tells them "You are not going to get anything
after all because the kids are grown and you don't deserve any
support." And who believe their husbands because they have
been conditioned to. And how we can bring them in here and
they are absolutely spineless creatures that are just spread all over
the floor and build them back into something with a spine and a
backbone and finally realize, I'm a human being and I have rights,
and they learn to stand up for themselves. It really is a real sense
of accomplishment.
This program has two dimensions, one empirical and one reha-
bilitative. Wendy often acts for women who have been intimidated
or conditioned by their husbands to accept less in divorce than the
law would secure for them. Transmitting this technical information
to such clients is not enough. Rather, their self-identity must be
reconstituted so that they understand that they deserve that to
which they are entitled. In the end, Wendy imagines that she pro-
duces not only optimal outcomes, she also produces new women.
Did she believe that she had wrought this transformation in
Kathy's case?
becomes a subject of inquiry. It was both a gesture of resistance and an assertion that no
more questions would be answered, not even that of why she was withdrawing. In a
domain where clients become subjects, it was a striking enactment of her power in rela-
tion to us.
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Interviewer: Did you find her an easy client, a hard client, to work
with? Sort of typical or not typical?
Wendy: I would say the biggest problem with that case was that it
was one of those hurry up and wait. There would be a lot of activ-
ity and then there was nothing.
Interviewer: Why do you think that was? Do you think she was
ambivalent about the divorce?
Wendy: Yes. I think that they still kind of cared for each other
quite a bit and I think that there was a lot of trouble letting go.
And a lot of hurt. And I used to hurt her feelings so much be-
cause I called her Kitty all the time because she struck me as a
Kitty.... A very soft person and to me that's a Kitty. And I mean
I would often call her Kitty and she would look so crushed-"My
own lawyer doesn't even know my name." I do know your name,
but you are just a Kitty to me. So I tried to be really careful and
call her Kathy. Kathy is harsher and to me she was just such a very
sweet person. I really felt very sad about that case because I liked
her so much as a person. So it was kind of sad the way it worked
out. But I think she was happy with the results in the long run
.... I get some cases where I just wish they would go away and
get somebody else because this is costing them too much for what
they are getting.
The gap between programmatic objectives and actuality in this
case is obvious. To remake clients requires powers no divorce law-
yer possesses. And Kathy was by no means remade into a new
woman. In fact, Wendy candidly admits to compounding the cli-
ent's difficulty of self-assertion.
CONCLUSION
We began this paper by arguing that power in lawyer-client in-
teraction is not the straightforward phenomenon generally depicted
in the literature, but a more subtle and complicated construct en-
acted through often ambiguous and conflicted behavior. 12 2 Some of
the more important respects in which power in lawyer-client rela-
tions differs from the conventional picture are that it is enacted
through implicit negotiation as well as overt action; that motives,
goals and data are often deliberately concealed; that power can be
elusive, even to the point of disappearing; that assertions of power
may be resisted openly or covertly; 12 3 that the locus and nature of
power changes over time; and that lawyer-client differences, even on
matters of great moment in a client's affairs, rarely result in open
confrontation.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 4-6, 10-92.
123 Scorr, supra note 10, at 136-38.
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We illustrated each of these attributes of power in the Case of
the Unsupported Wife. There was implicit negotiation in the con-
tinuing silence over case progress and in the ambiguity over who,
and under what circumstances, would control the critical decision
about spousal support. Concealed motives and goals were reflected
in the client's hopes about her husband's return, the lawyers' abdi-
cation of an active role in negotiations, the lawyer's failure to raise
the support issue at an early date, and her interest in personality
transformation. The insubstantiality of power is found in salient is-
sues with which no one connected, such as taking the support issue
to court or controlling the pace of case progress.
In addition, both Wendy and Kathy overtly as well as covertly
resisted efforts by the other to exercise power. Wendy resisted her
client's implicit attribution of responsibility for delay. Kathy re-
sisted her lawyer's insistence that she ask for support: even as Kathy
made the demand, she disowned it. Kathy resisted the notion that
the costs of maintaining good relations with her husband were too
high.
Avoidance of confrontation where there were differences about
important issues was also common. Though Kathy was upset with
the pace of progress, she did not complain about it to Wendy.
While she did not think that her husband would ever agree to pay
support, she did not confront her lawyer with her belief. Wendy, in
turn, believed that her client might well be headed for the welfare
rolls, but let her go her way without a fight.
In all of this we saw changes over time in the play of power and
resistance. But those changes were by no means linear. Subjects
would appear and disappear quite unpredictably from the negotiat-
ing agendas of lawyer and client. Indeed, in some sense Kathy and
Wendy traveled along different, and separate, trajectories through-
out the case. Power was enacted and performed, yet it was often
difficult to say who, if anyone, was "in charge," who, if anyone, was
directing the case. Power was at once shaped and reshaped, taken
and lost, present and absent.
When power is considered to be dynamic and fluid rather than
solid, stable and centralized, the subtle negotiations over reality and
responsibility that we see in the Case of the Unsupported Wife are
to be expected. Roughly comparable negotiations occur in all cases
we observed. This view of the nature of power in the professional
relationship does not, however, predict two dimensions of lawyer-
client interaction that we also observed-the avoidance of confron-
tation even in the fact of disagreement over important issues and
the reliance by clients on exit, rather than confrontation, as a re-
sponse to dissatisfaction.
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Divorce clients are typically weaker parties in their relationship
with their lawyers. The weaker party in a relationship that reflects a
major disparity in power does not often directly confront the
stronger. Slaves, prisoners, students, and wives subjected to patri-
archal hegemony have realized that effective resistance, even effec-
tive symbolic resistance, must be indirect, subtle, elusive and
ambiguous. In divorce, lawyer and client negotiate power, but they
do so on uneven terms. We have pointed out the entrenched posi-
tion of lawyers-their turf, their rules, their vernacular-and the en-
hanced vulnerability of clients-high stakes, high affect, and
inadequate resources. Avoidance and exit become the ultimate rec-
ognition of legal hierarchy, the final expression of a structurally-in-
ferior person who cannot fight, but will not surrender.
But what can we learn from the relutance of lawyers to insist
that clients accept their professional opinion, from their disinclina-
tion to insist on action that incorporates their professional judg-
ment? We interpret this behavior as a signal that the relationship
between lawyer and client is hierarchically complex; that although it
is not symmetrical, it is two-sided. The lawyers' position reflects
professional power, but clients have two sources of structural power
of their own-they pay the bills and they make the ultimate deci-
sions to settle or fight, to accept the deal or not. Lawyers almost
always want to retain clients on whose cases they have worked, and
they almost always want to be paid. Since clients who come into
direct and explicit conflict with their lawyers may conclude that their
only recourse is exit, lawyers who engage in explicit confrontation,
who draw lines in the sand rather than maneuver around impasses,
jeopardize both these objectives. Thus, our model, like any analysis
of the negotiation of power in human interaction, must take struc-
tural realities as well as individual initiatives into consideration.
To what extent is our view of the enactment of power in the
negotiation of reality and responsibility limited to the divorce cases
from which it is derived? Divorce practice is different from most
other legal practice.124 Divorce, more than most litigation,
originates in personal failure and rejection. The number of clients
in divorce who are experiencing some form of personal crisis is
high, probably higher than in parallel fields such as criminal law,
personal injury, worker compensation, landlord and tenant, con-
sumer, and bankruptcy. As a consequence, the negotiation of reality
may be more difficult and salient in divorce. And because divorce
law lies at the discretion end of the rules-discretion continuum, the
opportunity for creativity in interpreting the legally possible is
124 For a discussion of those differences, see O'GORMAN, supra note 26, at 61-64.
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greater than where rules narrow the scope of interim maneuvers
and acceptable outcomes. Perhaps most importantly, the relative
social status and economic power of divorce lawyers and their cli-
ents, rather than conforming to a single pattern, (as may be the case
in fields as diverse as criminal and corporate law), is more varied,
since the status of clients reflects the population at large. Thus, di-
vorce lawyers tend to encounter clients of diverse social and eco-
nomic status and, as a result, are less likely to develop patterns of
domination and control than lawyers whose social position, relative
to that of their clients, is more consistent.' 25
On the other hand, many of the enactments of power in negoti-
ations of reality and responsibility between divorce lawyers and
their clients do occur in other areas of practice. Lawyers and clients
must always negotiate a consistent version of events, an account of
the client's situation and interactions with the other side. They
must negotiate a fit between the client's goals and expectations and
the results achievable through legal process. They must negotiate
the timing of action to be taken in pursuit of the client's goals, and
the division of labor between them. In each of these areas, whether
the area of law be commercial or criminal, power is neither stable
nor static.
Only on rare occasions, then, does interaction between lawyers
and clients resemble a straightforward provision of technical serv-
ices to a generally complacent, dependent and weak laity. The in-
teraction is more often complex, shifting, frequently conflicted, and
negotiated. In the relationship between lawyer and client, the pro-
fessional, like it or not, shares power and resources with the client.
It is a relationship where the knowledge and experience of each may
be challenged by the other; where the economic investment of the
lawyer in any particular client may equal or out-strip the client's in-
vestment in the lawyer; where lawyers have conflicts of interest that
clients seek to identify and protect against; and where the humanity
of each may be constantly under the scrutiny of the other. Thus, the
nature of lawyer-client relationships beyond the context of divorce
cannot be captured by simple models of professional or lay domi-
nance, or by simple estimates of lawyer and client resources. Power
in those relationships is, like power everywhere, deeply embedded
in complex and changing processes of negotiation.
125 The importance of client status in determining the nature of lawyer-client inter-
action is highlighted in HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 28, at 59-64.
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